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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The European Commission under its Framework Programme for Research and Inno-
vation, Horizon 2020 1 promises to support firms‘ R&D activities within the Union
for e80 Billions in the form of grants by 2020. Similar framework programs have
been implemented since the years 80‘s providing during the years 90‘s up to 2
billions US $ per year (European Commission). Besides the EU framework, most
governments dispose their own national subsidies intervention set-up. Several
types of market failures have been presented as argument justifying such gov-
ernment interventions: knowledge spillovers (Grossman and Helpman, 1991),
making social returns to R&D higher than private returns, firms‘ low opportu-
nity cost in severe crisis (Ewijk, 1997), capital market imperfections (Stiglitz, 1993)
and the infant industry argument (Klepper, Moen, and Griliches, 2000). In prac-
tice, these funding may be allocated as bailout, as grant covering the whole cost
of the project without any own R&D investment contribution requirement for the
receiver private firm or as an additional R&D investment aiming for stimulating
private R&D investment.
Although the effects of public subsidies of R&D on private receivers‘ R&D
spending and more importantly their performance may be well known and al-
most unanimously acknowledged as been positive (Klepper, Moen, and Griliches,
2000, Clausen, 2009, Gorg and Strobl, 2007, Hall and Reenen, 1999), what effects
such subsidies may have on the long-term growth rate of an economy remain
ambiguous.
On the one hand, Segerstrom, 2000 in an earlier paper found that the long-run
effects of R&D subsidies on growth depends on a set of parameters. Given the
specification of his model, although R&D subsidies appear to enhance growth
in the short-run, the growth-retarding outcome is realized for a wide range of
plausible parameter values, at a temporal horizon depending on how fast con-
vergence occurs in the model.
On the other hand, (Acemoglu et al., 2013) found that subsidies to incum-
bents‘ R&D reduce growth and welfare whereas subsidies to both entrants and
incumbents‘ R&D combined with very high and almost impossible tax rates on
incumbents‘ operations will improve growth and welfare. The authors pointed
out a strong negative selection effect as the aggregate growth reducing mecha-
nism from R&D subsidies: R&D subsidies to incumbents impede the reallocation
of R&D inputs from inefficient incumbents to more efficient entrants, altering
then the productivity-survival link within industry.
1Horizon 2020, The Framework for Research and Innovation, COM(2011) 808 Final. Brussels,
30.11.2011
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Considering the latter findings, past R&D subsidies to private firms might
explain part of the European economic slowdown these last decades on the one
hand and these findings might stand as a warning for certain inappropriateness
of using subsidies to R&D as stimulus for the industrialization of backwards
economies. However, these findings may only not sound counter-intuitive given
subsidies to research have been proved to increase receivers firms investment in
R&D 2, but most importantly are at odds with recent findings from Acemoglu and
Cao (2015) stating the bulk of economy‘s productivity growth stemming from in-
cumbents and then less significance to reallocation-driven productivity growth 3.
This divergence indicates that the theoretical framework for analysing the effects
of R&D subsidies on growth should be revisited.
The aim of this study is to provide a theoretical framework useful to have
more insights on the long-run effects of R&D subsidies on the economy‘s ag-
gregate growth, departing from the firm level and taking into account the de-
terminants of innovation success and the industry dynamics affecting aggregate
growth that such policy may trigger.
I built a theoretical model based upon Acemoglu et al. (2013) in which there
are two sets of firms: Incumbents and potential entrants. Incumbents operate at
least one active product line and are engaged in research activities. Potential en-
trants do not own a product line but are engaged in R&D activities in order to
innovate and enter the industry. As entry, exit is endogenous. Besides the hetero-
geneity in size for incumbents, both incumbents and entrants are heterogeneous
in terms of their innovation capability. I introduced into the analysis, the concept
of firm‘s absorptive capacity defined as the firm‘s ability to identify, assimilate and
exploit knowledge from external environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and
based upon its past R&D activities.
In fact, recent empirical works found that ownproducts improvements by in-
cumbents appear to be by far larger than creative destruction by both entrants,
and that incumbents mostly improve upon their own products rather than other
incumbent‘s products (GarciaMarcia, Hsieh, and Klenow, 2015). Similarly, Ak-
cigit and Kerr (2015) demonstrated that higher rate of radical inventions of small
firms (mostly new entrants) is an outcome of their R&D investments choices in-
stead of their higher capabilities in research 4. These findings combined with
Cohen and Levinthal‘s insights seem to be very suggestive in highlighting how
critical is the firm‘s absorptive capacityin increasing its innovation capabilities.
Given the determinants of such a construct pointed out by previous literature
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, Cohen and Levinthal, 1990b, Nieto and Quevedo,
2Manfield (1986), Clausen (2009), Gorg and Strobl (2007), Lach (2000), Hall and Reenen (1999),
Einiö (2014)
3Acemoglu et al. (2013)‘s work, based on previous literature (Foster, Waltiwanger, and Krizan
(2001) and Foster, Waltiwanger, and Krizan (2006)) stressing on the important contribution of
reallocation (70-80% including mainly entry of more efficient and exit of less efficient firms) in
the economy‘s productivity growth, found that entrants contribute to 58% of the productivity
growth of the US economy whereas later on Acemoglu and Cao (2015) using different theoretical
framework found entrants‘ contribution at the firm level less than 35%
4They provided empirical evidence with data from LBD, USPTO data and NBER patent
database, based on the specification of their general equilibrium model departing from firm level
differentiating internal research from external research
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2005) and as suggested by Aghion and Jaravel (2015), I assume any incumbent
having advantage of it over any potential entrant.
I set up a simple proxy for firm‘s absorptive capacity given by the average
quality of product lines the firm owns and defined new different specifications
for incumbents and entrants‘ innovation functions. An incumbent‘s absorptive
capacity grants the firm an advantage in innovation capability and the economy‘s
average quality level of product lines acts as extra difficulty to overcome for po-
tential entrants.
The model delivers identical growth rate of the economy‘s in terms of struc-
ture, however with different content for the rate of innovation by incumbent firms
and the entry rate by potential entrants. It is likely that with the introduction of
the notion of absorptive capacity into the reference framework, the calibration of
my obtained model using the same data as (Acemoglu et al., 2013) would lead to
different values of innovation rate by both sets of firms and then different effects
of R&D subsidies on growth on the one hand and different relative contribution
of incumbent firms to the aggregate growth rate of the economy on the other
hand.
For the following of my study, I will start by exploring the previous litera-
ture related to the research question including the relevance of the construct of
absorptive capacity into my analysis framework, then will follow the extended
Acemoglu et al. (2013)‘s theoretical model followed by a discussion on the ex-
pected results and finally, I will proceed to concluding remarks.
4Chapter 2
Literature Review
My research question is related to several previous investigations in the eco-
nomic literature. First, the construct of absorptive capacity and R&D spillovers
within the context of innovative activities. Second, resources reallocation and
productivity-survival link within an industry with firm heterogeneity. Finally
and most directly to the effects of R&D subsidies on growth.
2.1 R&D, Spillovers and absorptive capacity
Concerning the relationship spillovers-innovation, its study can go back to Isaac
Newton. “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of the giants”.
The first point this statement from Sir Isaac Newton1 reveals is the importance
of existing breakthroughts upon which researchers rely on in order to build new
ones. Many studies have supported this statement from Newton. An empiri-
cal study by Caballero and Jaffe (1993) assessing knowledge spillovers and built
upon patent registrations and citations suggested that private research productiv-
ity declines of the same size as spillovers diffusion declines. Lin (2015) found that
knowledge spillovers from research universities affects positively firm‘s growth.
However, the same spillovers from R&D are pointed out as undermining firms
incentives to invest in innovative activities (Grossman and Helpman (1991), Ca-
ballero and Jaffe, 1993) and justify government interventions. Although it is clear
that spillovers affect positively research productivity, it is still a twist to argue
that they undermine incentives to innovate. In fact, as stated by Klepper, Moen,
and Griliches, 2000, given the complementary relationship that exists between
firms‘ R&D spillovers, firms have incentives to invest in order to be able to cap-
ture other firms spillovers: the effects of spillovers on R&D incentives may then
be ambiguous. A firm conducting only imitative R&D will contribute little to the
spillovers pool, whereas benefiting more from firms conducting innovative R&D
and in this case, spillovers may undermine incentives to innovate of the latter.
The second and less explicit point that may come up from the above cita-
tion from Sir Isaac Newton is that the conditional ability to grasp upon the Gi-
ant‘s body should not be underestimated. Although the importance of previous
breakthroughs from external sources is explicitly pointed out in this statement,
another implicit condition is the ability for new researchers to grasp giant‘s body
and reach his shoulders before standing upon them. This calls then on firm‘s
ability to benefit from available external knowledge. Cohen and Levinthal, 1989
1Sir Isaac Newton, letter to Robert Hook, February 5, 1675
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pioneering that ability, coined the construct of absorptive capacity and defined it
as the firm‘s ability to identify, assimilate and exploit new external knowledge.
Although this definition does not reveal explicitly the content of the construct, it
positions it as a firm‘s asset or a firm‘s resource. Later on in Fortune favors the Pre-
pared Firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990a), Cohen and Levinthal argued the firm‘s
absorptive capacity is not only the capability that enables firms to exploit new
external knowledge, but also allows it to predict accurately the nature of the fu-
ture technological advancement. Furthermore, the absorptive capacity increases
the speed and frequency of firms innovation because such innovations primarily
draw on firms knowledge base (Kim and Kogut, 1996).
At this point, we may think of absorptive capacity as enabling capability in
seizing technological opportunities only in domains related to prior firms knowl-
edge, then not affecting positively radical innovations. Bosch, Volberda, and Boer
(1996) argued that although incremental innovation are supported by an absorp-
tive capacity that provides a deep understanding of narrow range of closely re-
lated domains and helps to increase that depth, radical innovations may also be
supported by an absorptive capacity based on a broad range of loosely related
knowledge domains. Precisely, the firms absorptive capacity is built upon its
prior knowledge base and is a byproduct of the firms R&D investments (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990b). Later on, Hurry, Miller, and Bowman (1992) argued that
the more an organization innovates in an area, the faster it increases its absorp-
tive capacity in that area. This point then suggests a recursive relationship be-
tween absorptive capacity and innovation. Innovation as a positive outcome of a
new learning process fuelled by absorptive capacity, reinforcing in turn this lat-
ter. The sociocognitive processes underlying the concept of absorptive capacity
as suggested by Cohen and Levinthal, point out the firms absorptive capacity as
depending on the one of its individuals and more importantly to view it not only
from a structural perspective, but from a dynamic perspective. As consequence,
absorptive capacity is more likely to be developed and maintained as a byproduct
of routine activities when the knowledge domain that the firm is committed to ex-
ploit is related to its current knowledge base, otherwise, separated and exclusive
effort must be dedicated for its creation (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990b)
The firm‘s absorptive capacity is then a capability that is built over time upon
firms prior knowledge base from past R&D activities. However, this argument
may seem not to clearly favour an incumbent over a potential entrant, since both
are conducting R&D activities. Not only it is more likely an incumbent would
have spent more time and resources on R&D than an outsider, it may also pos-
sesses an advantage from its production experience (Klepper, 1996) and increases
its absorptive capacity. Empirical investigations on the effects of absorptive ca-
pacity on innovation outcomes have been carried out. Cohen and Klepper (1996)
via a firms‘ survey, noticed that innovative output depends positively on research
input, or research intensity or innovative effort which in turn does not hinges on
firm‘s size (Klette and Kortum, 2004). Nieto and Quevedo (2005) pointed out
the differences in absorptive capacity across firms as driving these differences
in R&D intensity across firms. The tacitness of the absorptive capacity empha-
sized by Cohen and Levinthal (1990b) and this conclusion shed then the light on
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the persistence in time in R&D intensity difference. Klette and Kortum (2004) ac-
knowledged that past knowledge affects positively R&D intensity, but is offset by
diminishing returns on expanding R&D investment whereas Nieto and Quevedo
(2005) considers a broad construct of absorptive capacity, including past knowl-
edge.
Given the above mentioned literature, the firm‘s absorptive capacity turns out
to be a critical input for its innovation production function.
2.2 Industry dynamics
Regarding the industry dynamics with respect to R&D activities, many schol-
ars have paid particular attention to it. Jovanovic (1982), Cin, Kim, and Vonor-
tas (2013) and Nocke (2003) pointed out the firm-level productivity-survival link
underlying reallocation as driver of productivity growth at the aggregate level.
Klepper (1996), with a firm-level endogenous technological change model featur-
ing firm‘s heterogeneity in random innovative capabilities and size, studied the
patterns of entry, exit, market structure and innovation of technologically pro-
gressive industry from its birth to its maturity. His model predicts that over time,
firms devote more effort to innovation, but the number of firms and the rate and
diversity of product innovation eventually wither. In mature industry, incum-
bent possessing the advantage of size focus on improving production processes,
increasing then further the minimum efficient size of firm and new firms can
enter the market only in succeeding in radical innovations (Klepper, 1996). In
Klepper (1996)‘ model, firm‘s expertise in product innovation differs randomly,
no matter whether an entrant or an incumbent. The type of distinctive capability
affecting the type of innovation (product or process) in which a firm engages on
is randomly distributed. However, though for product innovation, the type of
capability manifests itself by the type of client the firm services, the author ac-
knowledged that capability in process innovation is based on information that
firms commonly generate through production. This points out an advantage an
incumbent as an early entrant would have over a newly entrant in surviving the
industry‘s shakeout . With a different approach,
Ewijk (1997), focusing on industry dynamics along the business cycles found
that less productive firms are those that suffer more in recession; however if tak-
ing into account the substitution effect2 that may take place in that phase of the cy-
cle, there is hope for technology improvement. However, this substitution-effect-
driven productivity may be offset by the rusting effect 3. In fact, individual firm‘s
growth rate is greater in recession than in boom (substitution effect:positive ef-
fect) but the aggregate level of inactivity (rusting effect due to firm exit:negative
effect) may cause productivity loss. The author suggests that the former effect
prevails in mild fluctuations whereas the later in severe fluctuations. Given the
fact that most of entry is in boom phase (Ewijk, 1997), this result may suggest
2Substitution of production activities by R&D activities during the recession phase of the busi-
ness cycle (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998)
3The loss of knowledge associated with firms exit: Caballero and Hammour (1991)
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a ground for preventing exit of incumbents in severe crisis (Rationale for R&D
subsidies).
Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) using micro-data from firms, fo-
cused on investigating the contribution of plant-level technology and demand
fundamentals to survival and selection-based productivity growth. They found
that exiting firms have lower productivity levels (either revenue based or physical-
quantity-based) than incumbent. We may then think of Acemoglu et al. (2013)
main finding, that is the alteration of efficiency-based selection by R&D subsidies,
as being in line with Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008)‘s result. How-
ever, the gap is larger in magnitude for revenue based productivity:demand-side
shocks effects significantly affect firms growth and dominantly determine firm‘s
survival (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008). This means within the same
industry, a firm may be obliged to exit while having higher physical quantity
productivity than another firms remaining in the industry. In other words, real-
location within industry may be driven by profitability and not real output pro-
ductivity. Then, reallocation within industry may then not automatically drive
aggregate productivity growth. Which means a business may exit while being
able to contribute more than a surviving incumbent to the aggregate productivity
growth within an industry. Although entrants have higher productivity growth
than incumbent (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2008), their entry rate may
be inversely correlated with productivity growth since depressing profitability of
incumbents innovation (Acemoglu and Cao, 2015).
Another recent contribution in the reallocation- productivity growth literature
is from Acemoglu and Cao (2015). Using data from US innovative firms, with a
theoretical framework in which both entrants and incumbents are carrying out
innovative activities, they found that the large fraction of within industry pro-
ductivity growth is accounted by continuing establishments, which is at odds
with findings from previous literature on technological change models.
From the above mentioned literature, resources reallocation is driver of pro-
ductivity growth and the within industry survival is not always productivity-
based.
2.3 R&D subsidies and growth
The first wave of research in this section is related to the question of effectiveness
of government incentives on firm investments in R&D, and the second on the
effects of these subsidies on the long term growth of the economy.
The question of the effectiveness of incentive measures to R&D investment,
pioneered by Manfield (1986) who using data from US innovative firms, found
that there was less than 1.8 per cent increase in R&D expenditure due to tax
credit and that the due increase in R&D expenditure was at most a third of the
foregone revenue by the government. He then called for changes in tax credit
and the way to incentivize effectively firms for R&D investments. In the same
line,Clausen (2009), using data from a set of Norwegian firms conducting R&D
activities, found that R&D subsidies to Research activities stimulate R&D spend-
ing within firms whereas Development subsidies substitute it.
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Later on, Gorg and Strobl (2007) exploiting data from a sample of manufac-
turing firms in Ireland, found that both the size of public subsidy and the nature
of the firm matter for the effects of public R&D on private R&D : small grants in-
crease R&D spending for domestic plants whereas large grants lead to crowding-
out effects. In contrast, grants provision causes neither additionality nor crowd-
ing out effects for foreign plants no matter the size of the grant. Both Lach (2000)
and Hall and Reenen (1999) found positive effect of R&D subsidies on receiv-
ing firms‘ R&D investments. Regarding the effect of R&D subsidies on receiving
firm‘s productivity, Einiö (2014), exploiting geographic variation in government
funding based on the ERDF4 population-density rule found a positive effect of
R&D subsidies on long run productivity for marginal firms that received subsi-
dies resulting only from increase in governmental support in their region. This
result does not tell more about average effect of R&D subsidies on firm‘s pro-
ductivity. Furthermore, given granting agency‘s criterion, those marginal firms
turned out to be those having lower return rate of R&D, then lower research pro-
ductivity. Considering this characteristic, the increase in productivity three years
latter on in average turns out to be in line with Cohen and Levinthal (1989)‘ view
of R&D activities. In fact we may think that the support allowed them the first
here to conduct research, which increased their absorptive capacity gradually
making them more productive in research afterwards and with results on pro-
duction productivity the third year.
Regarding the effects of R&D subsidies on growth, the research was pioneered
by Davidson and Sergerstrom (1998). Considering decreasing returns to R&D ac-
tivities in an endogenous growth model featuring both innovation and imitation,
they found that innovative R&D subsidies foster growth whereas imitative R&D
subsidies lower it. Furthermore, for such an economy, the effects of general R&D
subsidies on the growth rate proxied by consumers utility growth depends on the
relative equilibrium value of innovative/imitative R&D ratio. Using computer
stimulation, they found that optimal public policy will consist in heavy subsidies
to innovative R&D and heavy tax rate on imitative R&D. However, besides the
fact that not taking into account the spillover effects of research, their model did
not allow for entry and exit of firms, then not capturing the effects of research
resources reallocation on growth due to subsidies policy.
Later on, Segerstrom (2000) in an endogenous growth model featuring both
vertical and horizontal R&D as engines of growth found that the long-run ef-
fects of R&D subsidies on growth depends on a set of parameters. General R&D
subsidy enhances long-run growth if it promotes the stronger of the two engines
of growth in the economy. Otherwise, if it promotes the weaker engine, it will
retard growth in the long-run. According to Segerstrom, an engine is stronger
when it is subject to lower diminishing returns compared to the other engine.
Given the properties of the model, R&D subsidies always appear to enhance
growth in the short-run and the temporal horizon at which the negative effects of
R&D subsidies will start affecting the economy will depend on how fast conver-
gence occurs in the model. Economic conditions in which either of the engines
of innovation has lower marginal returns remain not clearly stated. However,
4European union Regional Development Funds
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Segerstrom (2000)‘s model did not allow the margin for entry and exit, then not
being a suitable framework for analysing selection effects and industry structure
transformation that such policies may trigger.
Finally, Acemoglu et al. (2013) found that subsidies to incumbent firms‘ R&D
retard growth. In fact, although R&D subsidies improve performance of receiv-
ing firms, there may exist some counter effect mechanisms by which they af-
fect negatively both the overall growth rate of the economy and moreover, wel-
fare.Acemoglu et al., 2013 pointed out a strong negative selection effect as one
of those growth reducing mechanisms from R&D subsidies. The authors built
a micro founded model of endogenous growth with innovation by incumbents
and entrants. Using data from a sample of US innovative firms from the NBER
patents database, the USPTO database, the LBD and the CMF database, they es-
timated the parameters of the model and found that the economy growth rate
is reduced when incumbents‘ R&D or operations are subsidized. The mentioned
strong negative selection effect is due to the fact that R&D subsidies to incumbent
firms hinders the entry of more efficient new firms and the exit of less efficient in-
cumbents, and then prevent an optimal reallocation of R&D inputs (skilled work-
ers). Their policy experiments suggested an industrial policy favouring entry of
more efficient new firms while spurring exit of less efficient incumbents, by cou-
pling heavy tax on incumbents operations and small subsidies to their R&D.
Then, the ambiguous and somewhat diverging findings from previous litera-
ture highlight the uncertainty that may surround the effects of R&D subsidies on
the aggregate growth rate of the economy.
10
Chapter 3
A theoretical model
In this section, my aim is to set up a theoretical framework based on Acemoglu
et al. (2013) embedding features allowing the study of the effects of some policies
targeting firms on the growth of the whole economy, specifically the effects of
R&D subsidies on the long-run economic growth.
First, the framework links firm-level productivity growth to aggregate growth.
Secondly, it encompasses several level of heterogeneities: innovation capacities,
R&D effort and size. Third, it allows for both quality improvement and variety
expansion both for incumbents and potential entrants. Finally, besides exogenous
exit, it incorporates a mechanism for endogenous exit and entry, the survival of
the firm in both cases being productivity-based in absence of any support policy.
These included features aim at capturing some stated empirical regularities and
allowing for effects of targeted firm-level policy measures.
Unlike in Acemoglu and Cao (2015), in my model, incumbent and potential
entrant are equally likely to invest in new product exploration as in Klette and
Kortum (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2013) , but for the same research intensity, an
incumbent with only one active product line is not equally likely as a potential
entrant to succeed, incumbent having more likelihood, thanks to its absorptive ca-
pacity. The model starts by specifying the individual firm‘s innovation behaviour
either incumbent or potential entrant and leads to a general equilibrium account-
ing for the aggregate growth rate as stemming from any discovery made at the
firm-level.
3.1 Preferences and final good
A representative household in this continuous time economy has the CRRA pref-
erences given by
U0 =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−ρt)
C(t)1−ϑ − 1
1− ϑ dx (3.1)
where ρ > 0 is the the discount factor and C(t) a consumption aggregate. The
consumption aggregate is given by
C(t) =
(∫
N (t)
cj(t)
−1
 dj
) 1
−1
(3.2)
where cj(t) is the consumption of product j at time t.  > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between products and N(t) is the set of active products lines at time
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t. Because R&D costs are in terms of labour only, the output of each product line
equals the consumption of that given product and the following equality holds:
cj(t) = yj(t)
yj(t) being the amount of product j produced at time t in the economy. This
implies that the aggregate output of the economy is equal to the aggregate con-
sumption. We have then,
Y (t) = C(t)
In the economy, there are two types of labour: skilled labour and unskilled labour.
Unskilled labour which fixed total supply from the representative household is
normalized at 1, is used in production exclusively. Meanwhile, skilled workers
are used within the R&D sector and also used for operations like management,
back office functions, and other skilled-required tasks. It is assumed that the
operations of each product line and of each entrant as well require φ > 0 units of
skilled labour.
The fixed skilled labour supply from the representative household is of measure
LS . The total labour demand for unskilled labour, for skilled labour in operation
duties and for R&D activities are respectively LP , LF and LRD. The labour market
clearing will then require the following conditions:
LP = 1
and
LF + LRD = LS
The optimization problem of the representative household will consist in maxi-
mizing (3.1) subject to its following flow budget constraint
˙W (t) + C(t) ≤ r(t)W (t) + I(t)
and the usual noPonzi condition. I(t) the total labour income, is given by
I(t) = wu(t) + ws(t)LS
The asset position of the representative household W (t) is given by
W (t) =
∫
N(t)
Vj(t)dj .
r(t) is the equilibrium interest rate on assets and wu(t) and ws(t) are respectively
the unskilled and skilled wage rates.
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3.2 Intermediate good production
Intermediate goods constitute the point from which the growth of the economy
stem, and is therefore the target of any R&D activity. An improved intermediate
good produces in a more efficient way. A new intermediate good expands the
range of production tools, the variety of products that will be produced in the
economy and increases the range of choices available to consumers. Each inter-
mediate good is for a production of a single product line and thereafter, product
line or good and intermediate good are interchangeably used. Assuming that
there is enforceability of intellectual property rights, at a time t, there is only
one producer, a monopolist for any given intermediate good j. This monopolist
has the most advanced technology for that given intermediate good. There are
two different sets of firms in this economy: A set of active firms (F) which has
the monopoly over at least one product line and a set of potential entrants con-
ducting research for innovation. Any incumbent or even potential entrant, since
conducting R&D activities, may end up in innovating upon any existing product
line and becomes the new monopolist for that product line. For producing that
leading-edge intermediate good j of productivity level qf,j ,the monopolist needs
φ units of skilled labour for tasks like management and other operations, and
hires lf,j number of unskilled labour. It then has access to a linear technology in
the form
yf,j = qf,jlf,j (3.3)
with yf,j being the output for that good j. From this specification (3.3),the marginal
productivity of unskilled labour is qf,j units and then the marginal cost of produc-
tion is then given by w
u
qj
.
Therefore, the variation of unskilled wage affects marginal cost of production
and then product lines activity decisions. I define then for any product line j, its
relative productivity as
qˆ ≡ q
wu
(3.4)
This relative productivity may evolve either as outcome of innovation upon the
given product line or following variation in the unskilled wage rate.
This model economy is then made up of active firms of set F , each firm op-
erating at least one product line, which product lines are imperfect substitutes.
Then, the economy productivity index is defined as
Q ≡
(∫
N
q−1j dj
) 1
−1
(3.5)
This index gives the average level of the quality of the production tool in the
economy and evolves according to R&D outcomes.
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3.3 Heterogeneity and industry dynamics
Firms in my model economy are heterogeneous. First, firms are of different sizes:
the size here is proxied by the number of product lines that the firm operates. An
incumbent firm has at least one active product line. Second, firms of different age
coexist: firms newly entered and old firms that survived from creative destruc-
tion and obsolescence. Third, firms are different in type: the firm‘s type refers to
its comparative innovation capacity. Any firm in the economy can be either of
high-type (θH) or low-type (θL), according to its innovation capacity. This differ-
ence is assumed to be marked between two firms in the economy, when holding
other aspects of heterogeneity constant. For example, from two incumbent firms,
one may be of high-type and the other of low-type, idem for two potential en-
trants or two firms of the same age. The type here refers to any other capability
that a given firm either potential entrant or incumbent may have in innovating
that has not been gained from past research activities.
Concerning the absorptive capacity, I assume that any incumbent firm is en-
dowed with more absorptive capacity than any potential entrant, regardless of
its type. This constitutes the main divergence point from Acemoglu et al. (2013)‘s
framework. The combination of firm‘s type and firm‘s absorptive capacity im-
pacts innovation as described below, for incumbents and potential entrants.
3.3.1 Innovation by incumbents
I start this section by examining the R&D specification used by the reference
model, Acemoglu et al. (2013)1 following Klette and Kortum (2004) based on the
notion of knowledge capital. Although this notion of knowledge capital can be seen
as capturing the same content as Cohen and Levinthal (1989)‘s concept of absorp-
tive capacity, it leads to an innovation flow rate specification for both incumbents
and entrants presenting some counter intuitive shortcomings.
First, it proxies the firm‘s knowledge capital by the number of product lines it
operates. Although it is simple, it however gives the same weight to two firms
with the same number of plants or product lines no matter whether one is at the
bottom of the equilibrium productivity distribution whereas another is at the top
of the productivity distribution.
Second, it confers the same amount of knowledge capital to an incumbent op-
erating one product line and a potential entrant, which is counter-intuitive given
the comparative advantage of past research experience that any incumbent ben-
efits. By then, in an environment with knowledge spillovers, via the frontier
research dynamics either in technological space or market space, this notion of
knowledge capital is then limited in seizing properly the capabilities that innova-
tive firms would have built via their past R&D activities and which seem critical
in explaining at least part of heterogeneities in innovation intensity across firms
(Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Cohen and Levinthal (1990b), Nieto and Quevedo
(2005)). Therefore, considering the notion of firm‘s absorptive capacity in Co-
hen and Levinthal‘s sense, a different proxy of it entering the innovation function
1For an incumbent with n product lines, of type θK and h skilled workers hired for research, it
adds one new product in its portfolio at the following rate: Xf = θ
γ
fn
γ
fh
1−γ
f
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should be proposed.
In order to model the innovation production functions, I first state the following
assumptions:
Assumption 1: Research is undirected across product lines.
Firms do not know ex-ante upon which product line they will innovate, then their
expected returns to R&D is the expected value across all product lines j ∈ [0, 1]
Assumption 2: Within a given incumbent firm, the absorptive capacity as a
knowledge resource is non-rival.
The use of the firm‘s absorptive capacity as input in one product line research
unit does not diminish the quantity available to other research units within the
same firm. Absorptive capacity as innovation input, enters the firm‘s per prod-
uct innovation rate function at the same amount as in the firm‘s total flow rate of
innovation.
I then model the innovation by an incumbent firm as follows:
Incumbent firm can engage in improving upon its own product or improving
upon another firm product or even to innovate upon an inactive product line. For
an incumbent firm f of type k ∈ {h, l}, in time t, with h skilled workers hired for
research activities, and operating nf product lines with each of them j having a
productivity qj adds one more product line in its portfolio at the following flow
rate:
Xft = θ
γ
f q¯
γ
ft(hft)
1−γ (3.6)
2
with
q¯ft ≡
(∫
nft
q−1jf dj
) 1
−1
(3.7)
q¯ft is my proxy of the firm‘s f absorptive capacity which is a sort of productiv-
ity weighted index across firm f ‘s operated product lines. I assume q¯f > 1 in
equilibrium. Here it acts as a capability the firm‘s has gained from its past R&D
activities. This specification supposes that firms‘ past research activities grant
them more efficiency in innovating at the current period.
On top of avoiding the above mentioned shortcoming for Acemoglu et al.
(2013)‘s use of knowledge capital, my use of absorptive capacity and its proxy also
takes into account the fact that a firm with several product lines with low sub-
stitutability (greater differences) is likely to having conducted more research (or
to be short has more absorptive capacity) compared to a firm with product lines
very close.
2Notice this incumbent innovation flow rate corresponds to an innovation intensity (innova-
tion effort per product) xft = θ
γ
f q¯
γ
ft(
hft
nft
)1−γ . In fact, with the assumption 2, the same amount q¯ft
of absorptive capacity enters the per product innovation function instead of q¯ftnft
Chapter 3. A theoretical model 15
With γ ∈ (0, 1) , this function is linearly homogeneous in θ, q¯ft and hf and is
concave in each of these argument separately. This means an incumbent which
is as twice endowed with absorptive capacity as its counterpart of the same type,
will need to hire twice as much skilled labour in order to innovate twice as fast.
If I drop out the subscript t, the above specification leads to the following R&D
cost function
C(xf , θf , q¯f ) = w
snf q¯
− γ
1−γ
f x
1
1−γ
f θ
− γ
1−γ
f (3.8)
Proof: Appendix B2
For γ ∈ (0, 1), the R&D cost is a decreasing function of the type and the ab-
sorptive capacity of the firm.
Defining χ ≡ γ
1−γ , and
G(xf , θf ) ≡ x
1
1−γ
f θ
− γ
1−γ
f
, the above R&D cost function for an incumbent firm can be written as follows:
C(xf , θf , q¯f ) = w
snf q¯
−χ
f G(xf , θf ) (3.9)
The labour requirement for a per product innovation rate of x for an incumbent of
type θ is then given by q¯−χf G(x, θ), whereas in the basis model it is simply G(x, θ).
Given the assumption 1, successful innovation may be one of the following
cases:
First, the firm‘s research team is successful in innovating upon an existing
and active product line. Then, the innovation increases the productivity of that
product line by λqjt, then
qt+ = (1 + λ)qjt
λ > 0 is the innovation size parameter, measuring the proportional incremental
improvement upon the existing technology and qt+ is the productivity of that
product j after the innovation. The innovating firm then obtains the monopoly
over the product line j, since its has the leading-edge technology.
Second, the firm‘s research team is successful in innovating over an inactive
product line. This is the case for completely new product lines. The productiv-
ity of the new innovated product line is drawn from the stationary equilibrium
productivity distribution F (qˆ)
3.3.2 Innovation by entrants
At any time t, there are potential entrants conducting R&D activities in order to
enter the market of a product line. When a potential entrant, in addition to φ units
of skilled labour necessary for operations, hires h skilled labour into its research
team, it successfully enters the market by innovating with the flow rate xE given
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by:
xentry = (
θE
q¯t
)γh1−γ (3.10)
With, θE ∈ {θH , θL} and
q¯t ≡ (
∫
Nt
q−1j dj )
1
−1 (3.11)
3
q¯t is the average quality level of intermediate goods in the economy at time t.
From this flow rate of innovation, it can be noted that the economy‘s average
productivity index acts as an extra cost, that potential entrants bear in order to
enter the market. This expression suggests that by lessening the flow rate of inno-
vation from potential entrants, higher productivity index of an industry withers
the contribution of entry to the productivity growth in that industry, and then
less reallocation of R&D resources.
This specification endows a potential entrant with the same flow rate of in-
novation as a pseudo-incumbent of E-type, but lacking capabilities that an average
incumbent firm in the economy would have accumulated through its past R&D
activities that helped that incumbent to operate product lines which average pro-
ductivity index (q¯ft) is up to the economy‘s average productivity (q¯).
The above innovation function specification leads to the following R&D cost
function for a potential entrant.
C(xE, θE, q¯) = wsq¯χG(xE, θE) (3.12)
with the function G(xE, θE) being as defined above. Entrant‘s innovation cost
is increasing in the economy‘s productivity index. The more an economy is ad-
vanced, the harder it will be for an outsider (potential entrant) to innovate within,
or if we consider an industry, the more mature is an industry, the harder it is to
enter it. The total skilled labour requirement for a potential entrant in order to
achieve an innovation flow rate of xE is then given by
hentry = (φ+ q¯χG(xE, θE)) (3.13)
which is different from the basis model.
Entrant can innovate upon existing product lines or be successful in more rad-
ical innovation(corresponding to inactive product lines). In any of the cases, the
productivity of the product line on which the successful innovation takes on will
be determined as specified above for incumbents.
3Similar innovation flow rate is used by Akcigit and Kerr (2015) for external innovation by in-
cumbent firm, in a set up where they make a distinction between external innovation and internal
innovation. This specification is as follows:x = [Rxχ¯q¯ ]
1
ψ 1n>0 where 1n>0 is an indicator function for
firms having at least 1 product line, Rx is the cost of research, q¯ the average quality level in the
economy and with parameters χ > 0 and ψ > 1
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3.3.3 Firm and industry dynamics
Upon successful innovation, an entrant draws its type from θ ∈ {θH , θL}. It is
assumed that
Pr
(
θ = θH
)
= α
and
Pr
(
θ = θL
)
= (1− α)
with α ∈ (0, 1) and θH > θL > 0. Then, any potential entrant bases its R&D policy
upon the following free-entry condition:
maxxentry≥0
{− wsφ+ xentryEV entry (qˆ, θ)− wsq¯χG (xentry, θentry) } = 0 (3.14)
In stationary equilibrium, the measure of active potential entrant will be m lead-
ing to a total entry rate of Xentry = mxentry
The firm‘s survival and then the reallocation of resources within industry and
the whole industry dynamics are then driven by exogenous shocks and more im-
portantly by an endogenous mechanism via productivity growth or new break-
through from successful R&D activities. Regarding the endogenous mechanism,
any product line can undergo obsolescence. At any point in time, given the un-
skilled labour wage rate, there is a threshold level of productivity for any product
line to remain profitable. Any product line with productivity less than this thresh-
old, conditional on firm‘s type becomes obsolete. The endogenous character of
the obsolescence stems from the joint evolution of the unskilled wage rate and
the productivity index of the economy as shown in (3.21). In other words, the en-
dogenous obsolescence occurs when the productivity of a given product line lags
behind to certain extend compared to the evolution of the unskilled wage rate
within the economy. It should be noted that the fixed cost of operations as well
determines the profitability of any product line, its obsolescence decision (exit)
and then constitutes a point on which support policies may act on reallocation of
resources in the model.
The creative destructive shock is endogenously shaped by entrants‘s innova-
tion rate xentry and incumbents‘ innovation rate whenever the innovation occurs
in a product line not previously owned by the innovating incumbent. However,
it should be noted that in this framework, the rate of this Schumpeterian force of
creative destruction is assumed to be exogenous and of value τ .
Regarding the other exogenous shocks, it is assumed that high-type incum-
bents undergo transition shock at the exogenous flow rate ν and become of low-
type. This is to capture the fact that some powerful innovative firms at some
point in time become less innovative.
Additionally, there is possibility for any given firm‘s productivity to grow not
necessarily via R&D activities, but by simply learning from production opera-
tions. It is then assumed that each active incumbent firm adds one more product
line in its portfolio, taken from the inactive set of product line by receiving a pos-
itive productivity improvement shock at an exogenous rate % per active product
line.
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Finally, each firm is subject to a negative destructive shock at the exogenous
rate ϕ, and then exit the industry.
The above defined shocks can be summarized in the following table:
Shock Rate
Negative destructive shock ϕ
Transition from high-type to low-type shock ν
Non-R&D productivity growth positive shock %
Creative destructive shock τ
The rate of realization of each of the above mentioned shocks affects the value
of product lines in the economy.
Chapter 3. A theoretical model 19
3.4 Value functions
Firm‘s value is in fact the ultimate objective variable that any choice either entry
in new research line or production of new good have to maximize. It considers
any source of certain or expected value added, of expenditure and factors source
for discounting.
For a given firm in this economy, there are some exogenous shocks that may
affect firm‘s product line and then its value, and must importantly there is an
endogenous exit, which depends on the size and frequency of the firm‘s internal
innovation rate relative to the growth rate of the economy‘s productivity index,
depending on other firm‘s R&D outcomes. In other words, R&D policy decision
of the firm takes into account the firm‘s value maximization objective, meanwhile
determining the growth rate of the economy via the productivity increase at the
firm-level.
Since I am interested in analysing the model in the stationary equilibrium, all
the growing variables are normalized by (Q). Then the normalized value of a
generic value X becomes X˜ = X
Q
.
As exogenous shocks affecting the firm‘s value function, we have the produc-
tivity growth shock not related to R&D activities which rate is %, the negative
destructive shock which rate is ϕ and the transition from high-type shock that
concerns only high-type firm, which rate is ν. The firm‘s own innovation shock,
which rate is x endogenously affects its value as well and the creative destructive
shock that fundamentally is endogenous, but assumed here to be of the exoge-
nous rate τ , resulting from other firms‘ outcomes in research.
Then, the stationary equilibrium values for low-type and high-type are re-
spectively given by:
rV˜l
(
Qˆ
)
= max
{
0,maxx
[
p˜i (qˆ)− wsφ+
∑
qˆ∈Qˆ
[
τ [V˜l
(
Qˆ/qˆ
)
− V˜l
(
Qˆ
)
] +
∂V˜l
(
Qˆ
)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
]
− nw˜q¯−χf G
(
x, θL
)
+ nx[EV˜l
(
Qˆ ∪ qˆ(1 + λ)
)
− V˜l
(
Qˆ
)
]
+ n%[EV˜l
(
Qˆ
)
− V˜l
(
Qˆ
)
]
+ ϕ[EV˜l
(
0− V˜l
(
Qˆ
))
]
]}
(3.15)
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and
rV˜h
(
Qˆ
)
= max
{
0,maxx
[
p˜i (qˆ)− wsφ+
∑
qˆ∈Qˆ
[
τ [V˜h
(
Qˆ/qˆ
)
− V˜h
(
Qˆ
)
] +
∂V˜h
(
Qˆ
)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
]
− nw˜q¯−χf G
(
x, θH
)
+ nx[EV˜h
(
Qˆ ∪ qˆ(1 + λ)
)
− V˜h
(
Qˆ
)
]
+ n%[EV˜h
(
Qˆ
)
− V˜h
(
Qˆ
)
]
+ ϕ[EV˜h
(
0− V˜h
(
Qˆ
))
] + ν[IQˆ>Qˆl,min .V˜l
(
Qˆ
)
− V˜h
(
Qˆ
)
]
]}
(3.16)
where Qˆ ∪ {qˆj‘} is the new portfolio of the firm after successfully innovating
in the product line j‘. Similarly,Qˆ/{qˆj} denotes a loss of product line with tech-
nology qˆj from firm f‘s portfolio Qˆ due to creative destruction.
These value functions for both types are very similar, except their last line.
Their interpretation is as follows:
The left-hand side gives the flow value of a k-type firm with a set of product lines
given by Qˆ discounted at the rate r, and the right-hand side equals the compo-
nents that make up this flow value. For the right-hand side, the first line is the
net operating profit. The first element (with sum symbol) of the second line gives
the change in k-type firm‘s value attributed to the creative destruction at the rate
τ . The second and last element of that second line, that is
∂V˜k(Qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
, expresses
the variation in k-type firm‘s value due to the variation in a product line relative
productivity following variation in time of the unskilled wage rate in the econ-
omy. The first element of the third line considers the cost or research. The second
element of the third line expresses the variation in k-type firm‘s value when it
succeeds in increasing a product line productivity from qˆ to qˆ(1 + λ) at the rate
x per product line. The fourth line is the change in k-type firm‘s value due to an
exogenous gain of product line for reasons not related to research activities, at the
rate %. The first element of the last line gives the variation in k-type firm‘s value
when it exits after been hit by a negative shock at the rate ϕ. The last element of
the last line, which concerns only the high type firm, is the variation in high-type
firm‘s value when hit by the transition shock at the rate ν
Multi-product firms receive profit from each of their product line and the ob-
solescence decisions for product lines are independent. At the same time, since
research is undirected (assumption 1), product line quality improvement is equally
likely for each of the product line. This suggests the additive form of value func-
tion for a k-type firm as states by the following Lemma 1:
Lemma 1: The value function of a k ∈ {h, l} type firm takes an additive form
V˜k
(
Qˆ
)
=
∑
qˆ∈q
Υk (qˆ)
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where Υk (qˆ) is the franchise value of a product line with relative productivity qˆ to a firm
of type k. Moreover, Υk (qˆ) is strictly increasing and firms follow a cut-off rule for their
obsolescence decision such that
ιk (qˆ) =

= 1 if qˆ > qˆk,min
= 0 if qˆ < qˆk,min
∈ [0, 1] Otherwise
The above obsolescence cut-off rule is the central margin for the endogenous
exit for less productive firms. As long as the relative productivity of a given prod-
uct line is above the threshold conditional on firm-type, it remains active. Once
under the threshold, the product becomes obsolete and if it was the only product
for the firm, the firm exits the economy. Then any subsidy to incumbent firm is
going to affect the threshold point at which the firm must exit. Precisely, any sub-
sidy would endow a product line with a lower threshold productivity level than
otherwise, and would postpone by then the product line obsolescence.
With Lemma 1, I can now obtain the value function of each k-type firm via the
franchise value of each of its operating product line, this in terms of differential
equations as states in the following Lemma 2:
Lemma 2: the franchise values of owning a product line of relative productiv-
ity qˆ by low-type firm and high-type firm respectively are given by the following
differential equations:
(r + τ + ϕ) Υl (qˆ)− ∂Υ
l (qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
=
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ ωl}if qˆ > qˆl,min (3.17)
Υl (qˆ) = 0,Otherwise
and
(r + τ + ϕ) Υh (qˆ)− ∂Υ
h (qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
=
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ Ωh+ (3.18)
ν[Iqˆ>qˆl,min .υ
l (qˆ)− υh (qˆ)]}if qˆ > qˆh,min
Υh (qˆ) = 0,Otherwise
where Π and Ωk are respectively defined as follows:
Π ≡ 1
− 1[
− 1

]
Ωk ≡ maxx
{− w˜sq¯−χf G (xf , θk)+ xfEΥk (qˆ(1 + λ)) + %EΥk (qˆ)}for k ∈ {L,H}
The option value for a k-type firm is the expected net profit from engaging
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in research activities in a given product line, either an existing one or in an ex-
ploratory field. It follows from the k-type free-entry condition stated further
above.
These equations state the balance sheet value of a product line as equal to its
franchise value net of the total effective discount factor minus its variation due to
the variation in time of the unskilled labour wage rate in the economy, as long as
the relative productivity is above the obsolescence threshold.
From (3.21), we can note that the unskilled wage rate varies proportionately
with the economy‘s productivity index. This variation in unskilled wage rate is
then the underpinning of the endogenous obsolescence of product lines.
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3.5 Equilibrium
The rational behaviour of different agents, namely households and firms at a
given time t, leads to specific values for the different variables, the equilibrium
of the model. I am not interested in the time path of these equilibrium variables,
but at their value at a given point in time, and how these variables in general and
the growth rate in particular would react to some policy shocks.
The household‘s intertemporal choice between consumption and asset accu-
mulation and their remuneration delivers the following standard Euler equation:
C˙
C
=
r − ρ
ϑ
(3.19)
Proof: Appendix A1
The implicit final good market is competitive and each intermediate good
price is given by its marginal product from (3.2), which constitutes the inverse
demand facing the monopolist producing it. This inverse demand for a product j
is given by
pj = C
1
 c
− 1

j ,∀j ∈ [0, 1]
Innovation is assumed to be drastic, therefore, for a product line in which
the monopolist firm has the leading-edge technology, its objective is to solve the
following maximization problem:
pi (qj) = maxcj{
(
C
1
 c
− 1

j − qˆ−1j
)
cj}
This maximization problem determines the optimal quantity to be produced
by the monopolist and therefore the corresponding monopolistic price as follows:
pj =

(− 1) qˆj andcj = [
− 1

qˆj]
 (3.20)
Proof: Appendix A2
The corresponding equilibrium profit given by the optimal price and quantity
is:
pi (qˆj) =
qˆ−1j
− 1[
− 1

]C
The profit from a product line (intermediate good) is increasing in its produc-
tivity and the aggregate final good demand.
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Finally, the stationary equilibrium unskilled wage rate in production is deter-
mined from (3.2), using the results of (3.20).
wu =
− 1

Q (3.21)
where Q is given in (3.5)
Proof: Appendix B1
This expression suggests that the unskilled wage rate grows at the same rate
as the economy‘s productivity index. Then, product line that the productivity
fails to be upgraded will be more likely to become obsolete with the growth of
the aggregate productivity level in the economy.
The research decision of any incumbent conditional on its type is given by
xk = θ
kq¯f [
(1− γ)EΥk(qˆ(1 + λ))
w˜s
]
1−γ
γ for k ∈ {L,H} (3.22)
Proof: Appendix C1
The R&D effort of incumbent firm is positively affected by its (proxy of) ab-
sorptive capacity, being in line with Nieto and Quevedo (2005).
At the stationary equilibrium, the unskilled wage rate will determine the thresh-
old of productivity level at which each type of product line can profitably remain
active. Under this threshold, the product line becomes obsolete and the firm loses
its full franchise value. This threshold value qˆk,min, conditional on firm type is
given by:
qˆk,min =
(
w˜sφ− Ωk
Π
) 1
−1
for k ∈ {L,H} (3.23)
Proof: Appendix C2
Given the above R&D policy function, the solution to the differential equa-
tions of Lemma 2 is provided by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Let g and w˜s be the stationary equilibrium growth rate of the econ-
omy and the normalized skilled wage rate respectively. Moreover, given the following
definition,
Fk (x) ≡
[
1−
(
qˆk,min
qˆ
)x ]
the franchise value of a product line with relative productivity qˆ for a low-type firm is
given by:
Υl (qˆ) =
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + (− 1) gFl
(
Ψ + (− 1) g
g
)
+
Ωl − w˜sφ
Ψ
F l
(
Ψ
g
)
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, where Ψ ≡ (r + τ + ϕ).
Proof: Appendix D
Similarly, the franchise value of a product line with relative productivity qˆ for a high-
type firm is given by:
Υh (qˆ) =

= Πqˆ
−1
Ψ+ν+(−1)gFh
(
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
)
− w˜sφ−Ωh
Ψ+ν
Fh
(
Ψ+ν
g
)
for qˆ ∈ [qˆh,min, qˆl,min]
=
{
Πqˆ−1
Ψ+ν+(−1)gFh
(
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
)
+ Ω
h−w˜sφ
Ψ+ν
F h
(
Ψ+ν
g
)
+ Πqˆ
−1
Ψ+(−1)gFl
(
Ψ+(−1)g
g
)
+ Ω
l−w˜sφ
Ψ
F l
(
Ψ
g
)
− Πqˆ−1
Ψ+ν+(−1)gFl
(
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
)
+ Ω
h−w˜sφ
Ψ+ν
Fl
(
Ψ+ν
g
)}
for qˆ ≥ qˆl,min
Proof: Appendix E
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3.6 Labour market and stationary equilibrium
The total supply of unskilled labour is normalized at 1, which equals the total
demand in the equilibrium. Then the unskilled labour market clearing condition
is ∫
N
ι (qˆj) dj [
− 1

1
w
]C
∫
N
q−1j dj = 1 (3.24)
Regarding the skilled labour market, the total demand is given by entrants
and incumbents‘ needs in skilled labour, both for research and fixed costs of op-
erations. This market is then conditioned by the type shares of product lines and
the related productivity distributions.
Then, let denote by Φh, Φl and Φnp the shares of product lines belonging to
high-type, low-type and inactive product lines respectively, with Φh+Φl+Φnp = 1.
Given the stationary equilibrium productivity distributions of any k-type firm
Fk (qˆ) on [qˆk,min,∞), the skilled labour market clearing condition is given by:
m[φ+G
(
xentry, θentry
)
] +
∫
N
 ∑
k∈{k,l}
Φk[hk(w
s) + φ]
 = LS (3.25)
Finally, using (3.5), (3.20) and (3.21), the previous labour market condition
gives
Y = C = Q (3.26)
The exogenous and endogenous shocks mentioned above shape the realloca-
tion of resources, of market shares and finally the whole industry dynamics. The
productivity distributions conditional on firm type evolve whenever any of these
shocks comes to be realized. The amount of skilled workers hired being depen-
dent on the firm‘s type, there is need to characterize the measure of the share of
product lines owned by each type of firm in equilibrium. This is done by the
following equations:
(
αXentry + Φhxh
) (
1− Φh)+ %Φh = {Φh (ν + φ+Xentry (1− α) + Φlxl)
+ Φhqˆh,mingfh (qˆh,min)
}
(3.27)
{ (
Xentry(1− α) + Φlxl) (1− Φl)
+ Φhν[1− Fh(qˆl,min)] + νΦl
}
= Φl
(
φ+Xentryα + Φhxh
)
+ Φlqˆl,mingfl (qˆl,min)
(3.28)
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{
φ(1− Φnp) + Φhqˆh,mingfh (qˆh,min)
+ Φlqˆl,mingfl (qˆl,min) + Φ
hνFh(qˆl,min)
}
= %(1−Φnp) + Φnp (Xentry + Φhxh + Φlxl)
(3.29)
In each equation, the left-hand side expresses the inflows into the product
lines of type h, l and np (which are respectively controlled by high-type, low-type
firms and inactive) and the right-hand side expresses the outflows. The main
terms making up these equations can be interpreted as follows, which interpreta-
tions provide intuition for the remaining terms:
High-type
αXentry: High-type entrants innovation upon an inactive product line or pre-
viously belonging to a low-type (total share of such product lines is
(
1− Φh).
Φhxh: high-type incumbents innovation upon a product line not previously
belonging to a high-type.
%Φh: High-type innovation not driven by R&D
Φhxh+Φlqˆl,mingfl (qˆl,min): Outflow (due to obsolescence) of a product line con-
trolled so far by high-type when relative productivity qˆ < qˆh,min, driven by the
increase in the economy‘s wide productivity index g.
ΦhXentry (1− α): Product lines taken away from high-type by a low-type en-
trant.
ΦhΦlxl: Product lines taken away from high-type by a low-type incumbent.
Φhν: High-type product lines transitioned to low-type.
Φhϕ: High-type product lines destroyed by the negative exogenous destruc-
tive shock.
Low-type
Φhν[1 − Fh(qˆl,min)]: Transition of product lines from high-type to low-type
when hit by the negative shock with rate ν provided that qˆh < qˆl,min
The remaining specification for solving the market clearing condition is to
characterize the stationary equilibrium productivity distributions conditional on
firm type. These distributions at the stationary equilibrium are in such away that
the flow into and out of any interval of productivity are equalized. This is done
Chapter 3. A theoretical model 28
by the following lemma.
Lemma 3: The stationary equilibrium (invariant) productivity distributions of active
product lines of low-type and high-type satisfy the following equations:
gqˆfl(qˆ) =

[
gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min) + (τ + φ+ ν)[Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min)]
−
(
Φhxh +Xentryαﬄ
Φh
)ΦhFh( qˆ1− λ) + ΦlFl( qˆ1− λ)
+(1− Φ)F (qˆ)
]for qˆl,crit < qˆ
gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min) + (τ + φ+ ν)[Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min)]for qˆh,min < qˆ ≤ qˆh,crit
(3.30)
and
gqˆfh(qˆ) =

= gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min) + (τ + ν + ρ))[Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min)]
− (Φxh+αXentry)
Φh
[ΦhFh(
qˆ
1+λ
) + ΦlFl(
qˆ
1+λ
) + ΦnpF (qˆ)]for qˆ > qˆh,min(1 + λ)
= gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min) + (τ + ν + ρ)[Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min)]
for qˆh,min(1 + λ) < qˆ ≤ qˆh,min(1 + g∆t)
(3.31)
Where Φ ≡ Φh+Φl is the measure of active product lines and qˆl,crit ≡ qˆl,min(1+
λ)
Proof: Appendix F
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3.7 Aggregate growth
One of the aims of the above described framework is to link the aggregate growth
rate of the economy to the productivity growth at the firm-level. In this econ-
omy as shown by (3.26), the output growth is the consequence of intermediate
goods productivity improvement and discovery of new ones, each intermediate
good contributing in the way expressed by (3.5). Moreover, given the stationary
equilibrium productivity distributions conditional on firm type, the productivity
index of product lines owned by high-type firms and the productivity index of
product lines owned by low-type firms grow at the same rate.
If I denote the type-specific productivity indices by
Q˜kt =
∫
N st
q−1jt dj
where k ∈ {h, l}, we have the firm-type productivity index growth given by
gh =
∂Q˜ht
∂t
Q˜ht
and the equality holds for the aggregate output growth rate.
g =
gh
− 1 =
gl
− 1
The next proposition gives the growth rate of the economy stemming from the
firm-level.
Proposition 2: The growth rate of the economy is then equal to
g =
(
xh + αXentry
)
[(1 + λ)−1(1 + 1
Γ
) + κh] + %Φ
hκh − (τ + ν + φ)
− 1 + qˆh,minfh(qˆh,min) (3.32)
Where κk ≡
ΦnpE
Fq−1t
Q˜kt
is the ratio of the productivity index of inactive product lines to k-type pro-
ductivity index. The ratio of productivity index of low-type to that of high-type
active product lines Γ ≡ Q˜h
Q˜l
is solution to
{
(xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)−1(1 +
1
Γ
) + κh]
+%κh[Φ
h − ΦlΓ]
}
=
{(xl + (1− α)Xentry) [(1 + λ)−1(1 + 1
Γ
) + κl]
+ν[1 + [1− Fh(qˆl,min)]Γ]
+g[qˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)− qˆl,minfl(qˆl,min)]
}
This equality follows the fact that in the equilibrium, the productivity index
of product lines owned by high-type firms grows at the same rate as the produc-
tivity index of product lines owned by low-type firms.
Proof: Appendix G
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The above aggregate growth rate is obtained from high-type product lines and
is exactly equivalent to the one derived from the low-type product lines. The nu-
merator of this growth rate expression comprises the contribution of incumbents
and entrants via successful innovation in the productivity distribution, the posi-
tive impact of productivity growth for non-R&D related activities net of negative
shocks that these product lines are subject to. The denominator adjusts for the
improvement of productivity due to obsolescence. The equilibrium values of xh
and Xentry are likely to be different from what are obtained in Acemoglu et al.
(2013), conditional on other parameters of the model.
Definition: Stationary equilibrium A stationary equilibrium of this economy
is a list of the following objects
{yj, pj, lj, V˜l, V˜h, qˆh,min, qˆl,min, xh, xl, xentry, hh, hl, hentry,m,Φh,Φl,Φnp,Fh(qˆ),Fl(qˆ),
ws, wu, g, r, q¯}
such that [i] yj and pj maximizes profits as in (3.20) and the labour demand lj
satisfies (3.3);[ii] V˜h and V˜h are given by the low-type value function in (3.15)and
(3.16); [iii] (qˆh,min, qˆl,min) satisfy the cut-off rule in (3.23); [iv]xh and xl are given
by the the R&D policy functions in (3.22) and xentry and m satisfy the free-entry
condition in (3.14); [v] the skilled worker demands hh, hl and hentry satisfy (3.6)
and (3.13); [vi] The product line shares (Φh,Φl,Φnp) satisfy ((3.27)) - (3.29); [vii]
The stationary equilibrium productivity distributions (Fh(qˆ),Fl(qˆ)) satisfy (3.30)
and (3.31); [viii] The growth rate is given by (3.32); [ix] The interest rate satisfies
the Euler equation (3.32); [x]ws andwu are consistent with labour market clearing
for unskilled and skilled workers as given by (3.24) and (3.25) and [xi] q¯ is given
by (3.11); [xii] q¯f given by (3.7).
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3.8 Discussion
At this stage of my analysis, I stand on the likely results my framework may yield
in light with results obtained by the basis model and the pointed mechanisms.
Acemoglu et al. (2013) conducts some policy experiments with the estimated
parameters of their model.
First, subsidies to incumbents‘ operation costs reduce growth: subsidies keep
low-type incumbents in activities more than a social planner would, by lower-
ing their exit via obsolescence; by then, they exacerbate skilled wage rate and
discourage the more efficient entrants.
Second, subsidies to incumbents R&D reduces growth: greater R&D for in-
cumbents due to subsidies not only discourages entry by increasing creative de-
struction, but increases the skilled wage rate by greater demand of skilled labour.
Resources are then reallocate from entrants to incumbents (perversely to low-type
incumbents).
Third, subsidies to entry have positive effects (of trivial size) on growth: the
higher demand for skilled labour induced by entry increases their wage rate and
increases the threshold of obsolescence as well, especially for low-type incum-
bents. There is then a positive selection effect, reallocating resources from less
efficient incumbents to more efficient entrants. Their proposed optimal policy is
then a fairly small subsidy to incumbents‘ R&D coupled with a large tax rate (ap-
proximately 26% of their revenues) on incumbents‘ operations will yield a result
close to the social planner‘s result. Low-type incumbents will then be forced to
exit and free up then the R&D resources that will be reallocated to more efficient
entrants.
As it as been shown in section 3 above, with the specification taking into ac-
count the concept of firm‘s absorptive capacity, in equilibrium, the labour require-
ment for a per product innovation rate for a given incumbent is more likely to be
lower compared to the reference model. In my model, there is a new comparative
advantage in innovating recognized to incumbents, and importantly including
low-type incumbents which are at the source of the strong negative selection ef-
fect induced by R&D subsidies in Acemoglu et al. (2013)‘s model. I expect the set
up framework to produce different results from Acemoglu et al. (2013) through
the following channels:
First, in equilibrium, a given low-type incumbent needs less skilled workers
for the same innovation rate; Indeed, in equilibrium, the gap in research efficiency
between low-type incumbent and potential entrant is likely to be narrowed. In
fact, on the one hand, a low-type incumbent benefits now from its absorptive
capacity in innovating and on the other hand, potential entrants are "penalized"
by their lack of absorptive capacity. Then, although there is still a negative se-
lection effect, it is expected not to be as strong as in the basis model since here,
low-type are more likely to be more efficient and entry more difficult. In other
words, if any, the lost incurred by the economy due to subsidies to incumbents‘
R&D, keeping then for long time resources (skilled labour) within an inefficient
use by low-type incumbents instead of reallocating them to entrant is expected
not be be has much as in the basis model.
Chapter 3. A theoretical model 32
Second, overall incumbent demand (Or high-type skilled labour requirement
for a per product innovation rate) in skilled workers is lower; In fact, incumbent
R&D subsidies will increase their R&D. But unlike in the basis model, in order
to achieve the same innovation rate, they will need lesser skilled labour in equi-
librium as shown by the skilled labour requirement for a per product innovation
rate of x given by q¯−χG(x, θ) compared to G(x, θ) in the basis model, subject to
a constant trend for G(x, θ) in the worst of cases compared to the basis model.
This will then be less upwards pressure on the skilled labour wage rate that was
pointed out by Acemoglu et al. (2013) as responsible for the reduction of R&D by
both entrants and incumbents.
Third, entrants‘ profitability is lessening by the average level of economy‘s
productivity, increasing then the innovation incentives for incumbents. In fact,
another channel of results improvement may come from the fact that less in-
novation rate for potential entrants will reduce the overall creative destruction
from incumbent‘s view and then discourage less innovation by incumbents ei-
ther without or with the subsidies to research.
In sum, my framework via the above mentioned channels is then more likely
to yield a decomposition of the economy‘s growth rate with greater contribution
from incumbents compared to entrants in contrary to Acemoglu et al. (2013), but
in accords with Akcigit and Kerr (2015), Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Garcia-
Marcia, Hsieh, and Klenow (2015).
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Conclusion
I have set up a theoretical framework that may shed more light on the effects of
R&D subsidies on the aggregate growth rate of economy, by including the con-
cept of firm‘s absorptive capacity into a baseline model by Acemoglu et al. (2013),
following Klette and Kortum (2004). Considering this concept of absorptive capac-
ity in Cohen and Levinthal (1989)‘s spirit led to defining a proxy of it taking into
account the number of product lines firm operates, their quality level and their
closeness. I have motivated why this measure is different from the concept of
knowledge capital used by Klette and Kortum (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2013)
and why it may capture in a more accurate way the firm‘s current capability in
innovation efficiency gained from past research activities. Different innovations
functions for incumbents and potential entrants have being specified in light to
the concept. By including the concept of absorptive capacity into the framework,
I introduced an endogenous time variation in firm‘s innovation capacity in ad-
dition to the exogenous variation induced by the transition of high-type firms to
low-type.
The obtained framework features heterogeneity in size and innovation capa-
bilities and allows for endogenous entry and exit. A product line which pro-
ductivity growth lags behind comparatively to the growth rate of the unskilled
labour wage in the economy is more likely to become obsolete, and in absence of
any support measure like subsidies, the corresponding firm is more likely to exit
the economy. The aggregate output growth stems from the growth of individ-
ual firm‘s intermediate goods productivity. Unlike the reference model, in light
with the notion of absorptive capacity and supported by recent empirical find-
ings by GarciaMarcia, Hsieh, and Klenow (2015) and Akcigit and Kerr (2015), an
incumbent has clear advantage over a potential entrant in innovation likelihood,
other innovation determinants held constant. Therefore, although the obtained
growth rate has the same structure as in Acemoglu et al. (2013), the content of in-
cumbents‘ rate of innovation and entrants‘ rate of entry is different. This is more
likely to deliver different empirical results from the reference model.
The main future direction following this study would be to confront this model
to the same data used in the reference model. A second line may be to extend the
model to study the within industry reallocation, the survival dynamics at dif-
ferent stages of industrial development. Finally, the model may be extended to
include the transition of non-innovative firms to innovative ones and shed then
more light on policies that may be beneficial for a take-off of a vibrant and inno-
vative manufacturing sector in backwards economies.
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Appendix A
Euler equation, equilibrium price
and profits
Appendix A1: Euler Equation
A representative household would chose a consumption value that maximizes
(3.1) subject to its wealth accumulation constraint. The consumption price is nor-
malized at 1. I drop out the subscript t and the resulting Hamiltonian is
H = U0 + λW˙ (A.1)
=
C1−ν − 1
1− ν + λ
(
[wu + wsLS] +Wr − C) (A.2)
With consumption as control variable and wealth as state variable, we obtain
the following relations for solving the maximization problem by the Maximum
principle Method:
H = U0 + λW˙ =
C1−ν−1
1−ν + λ(Y +Wr − C)
∂λ
∂t
= ρλ− ∂H
∂W
andλ(T ).W (T )exp−ρT = 0
∂H
∂C
= 0
(A.3)
∂H
∂C
= C−ν − λ
⇒ C = (λ)− 1ν
∂λ
∂t
= ρλ− rλ = (ρ− r)λ
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lnC = −1
ν
lnλ
∂lnC
∂C
=
C˙
C
=
−1
ν
λ˙
λ
⇒ C˙
C
=
−1
ν
(ρ− r)λ
λ
= −[ρ− r
ν
]
⇒ C˙
C
=
r − ρ
ν
which gives the resulting standard Euler Equation.
Appendix A2: Intermediate good price and monop-
olist profits.
From the final good producer side, the price of each intermediate good she
uses is its marginal product, since the final good (product) market is competitive,
each factor is remunerated at its marginal product. This price will correspond
to the inverse demand facing the monopolist producing the given intermediate
good. In turn, the monopolist will set a quantity that maximizes its profit and
thus, there will be a corresponding equilibrium price for any given intermediate
good.
pj =
∂C(t)
∂cj(t)
=

− 1
− 1

c
−1

−1
j
(∫
N (t)
c
−1

j dj
) 
−1−1
= c
− 1

j
(∫
N (t)
c
−1

j dj
) 1
−1


= c
− 1

j
(∫
N (t)
c
−1

j dj
) 
−1
1

= c
− 1

j C
1

∀j ∈ [0, 1]
The monopolist producer would determine its optimal quantity to be pro-
duced from the following profit maximization problem:
maxcj
{
[c
− 1

j C
1
 − w
u
qj
]cj
}
= maxcj
{
[c
− 1

j C
1
 − qˆ−1j ]cj
}
∂Πj
∂cj
=
− 1

C
1
 c
− 1

j − qˆ−1j = 0
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c∗j = [
qˆ−1j
(−1)C 1

]−
= [

− 1
1
qˆj
]−C
= [
1

−1
1
qˆj
]C
= [
− 1

qˆj]
C
Which optimal quantity will correspond to the following equilibrium price for
the intermediate good j
pj = c
∗
j
− 1
C
1
 =
(
− 1

qˆj]
C
)− 1

C
1

then,
p∗j = [
− 1

qˆj]
−1C0
=

− 1
1
qˆj
The equilibrium profit is then given by
Π∗j =
(
p∗j − qˆ−1j
)
c∗j
= [

− 1
1
qˆj
− qˆ−1j ][
− 1

]C
= qˆ−1j qˆ

j(
1
− 1)(
− 1

)C
= [qˆj
− 1

]−1
1

C
=
qˆ−1j
− 1(
− 1

)C
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Appendix B
Unskilled wage and R&D cost
Appendix B1: Unskilled wage rate.
With the subscript t dropped out, the unskilled labour wage rate is given by
C =
(∫
N
c
−1

j dj
) 
−1
=
(∫
N
([
− 1

qˆj]
)C)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
this leads to
C
C
= 1 = [
∫
N
(
− 1

qˆj)
−1dj ]

−1
= (
− 1

)(
1
wu
)[
∫
N
q−1j dj ]

−1
= (
− 1

)(
1
wu
)−1Q
This further leads to
(
1
wu
)−1 =
1
( −1

)Q
⇒ (wu) = [(− 1

)Q]
1

Then,
wu =
− 1

Q
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Appendix B2: Total R&D cost.
The total R&D cost will be the product of number of hired skilled labour and
the skilled labour wage rate.We have:
C(x, θ, q¯f ) = w
s.h
We know that
xft = θ
γ
f q¯
γ
ft(
hft
n ft
)1−γ
If I drop out the time subscript, I have:
⇒ hf = x
1
1−γn
1−γ
1−γ
f θ
− γ
1−γ
f q¯
− γ
1−γ
f
= nf q¯
− γ
1−γ
f x
1
1−γ θ−
γ
1−γ
= nf q¯
−χ
f G(xf , θf )
then,
C(x, θ, q¯f ) = w
s.h
= wsnf q¯
−χ
f G(xf , θf )
The R&D cost for an entrant is similarly determined.
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Appendix C
R&D policy and productivity
threshold for obsolescence
Appendix C1: R&D policy.
The R&D intensity value will be chosen by any given firm (either high-type
or low-type) to maximize its expected net gain from doing research. The commit-
ment to R&D has as objective the following programme:
maxxk≥0
{− wsφ+ xentryEΥk(qˆ(1 + λ))− wsq¯−χf G (xentry, θentry) } = 0 (C.1)
Here,EΥentry(qˆ(1+λ)) is the expected franchise value of the product line in which
there the entrant successfully innovate and then draws the type-k upon entry.
Then, we have
∂(−wsφ+ xkEΥk(qˆ(1 + λ))− wsq¯−χf G (xentry, θentry))
∂x
= EΥk(qˆ(1 + λ))− w˜sq¯−χf
1
1− γx
γ
1−γ θ−
γ
1−γ
⇒ xk = θkq¯f [ (1− γ)EΥ
k(qˆ(1 + λ))
w˜s
]
1−γ
γ
Appendix C2: The obsolescence value of the relative
productivity for a k-type firm.
At the limit value of the relative productivity, the derivative of the franchise
value for the given product line equals zero. For a low-type firm, we have
Υl (qˆ) =
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + (− 1) gFl
(
Ψ + (− 1) g
g
)
+
Ωl − w˜sφ
Ψ
F l
(
Ψ
g
)
∂Υl (qˆ)
∂qˆ
|qˆ=qˆl,min =
1
g
[Πqˆ−2l,min +
(Ωl − w˜sφ)
qˆl,min
]
Appendix C. R&D policy and productivity threshold for obsolescence 40
∂Υl (qˆ)
∂qˆ
|qˆ=qˆl,min = 0
⇒ qˆl,min = [(w˜
sφ)− Ωl
Π
]
1
−1
For a product line controlled by a high-type firm, we have
Υh (qˆ) =

= Πqˆ
−1
Ψ+ν+(−1)gFh
(
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
)
− w˜sφ−Ωh
Ψ+ν
Fh
(
Ψ+ν
g
)
for qˆ ∈ [qˆh,min, qˆl,min]
=
{
Πqˆ−1
Ψ+ν+(−1)gFh
(
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
)
+ Ω
h−w˜sφ
Ψ+ν
F h
(
Ψ+ν
g
)
+ Πqˆ
−1
Ψ+(−1)gFl
(
Ψ+(−1)g
g
)
+ Ω
l−w˜sφ
Ψ
F l
(
Ψ
g
)
− Πqˆ−1
Ψ+ν+(−1)gFl
(
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
)
+ Ω
h−w˜sφ
Ψ+ν
Fl
(
Ψ+ν
g
)}
for qˆ ≥ qˆl,min
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
|qˆ=qˆh,min =
Π
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [(− 1)qˆ
−2
h,min +
Ψ + ν
g
qˆ
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
h,min qˆh,min]
− w˜
sφ− Ωh
g
qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
h,minqˆ
−Ψ+ν
g
−1
h,min
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
|qˆ=qˆh,min =
Πqˆ−2h,min
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [(− 1) +
Ψ + ν
g
]− w˜
sφ− Ωh
g
qˆ−1h,min
=
Π
g
qˆ−2h,min −
w˜sφ− Ωh
g
qˆ−1h,min
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
|qˆ=qˆh,min = 0
⇒
Π
g
w˜sφ−Ωh
g
=
qˆ−1h,min
qˆ−2h,min
qˆh,min = [
(w˜sφ)− Ωh
Π
]
1
−1
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Appendix D
Proof of the Proposition 1: The
franchise value of low-type
A- For a low-type firm
The franchise value for a product line of relative productivity qˆ controlled by
a low-type firm is given by:
(r + τ + ϕ) Υl (qˆ)− ∂Υ
l (qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
=
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ ωl}if qˆ > qˆl,min (D.1)
This is a linear first order differential equation non homogeneous. It can be equiv-
alent to the following general form:
ΨΥl (qˆ)− A∂Υ
l (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= W (D.2)
with Ψ = (r + τ + ϕ), A = ∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
and W =
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ ωl}
Given the specifications (3.21) and (3.4) the unskilled wage rate varies with
the economy‘s productivity index Q, the relative productivity qˆ will grow at the
rate −g. Then we have
A =
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
= [qˆ(1− g)− qˆ]
= qˆ[(1− g)− 1]
= −gqˆ
(D.1) is then equivalent to
ΨΥl (qˆ)− (−gqˆ)∂Υ
l (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= W
Ψ
g
qˆ−1Υl (qˆ) +
∂Υl (qˆ)
∂qˆ
=
{Π
g
qˆ−2 − (w˜
sφ− ωl
g
)qˆ−1
}
R1qˆ
−1Υl (qˆ) +
∂Υl (qˆ)
∂qˆ
=
{
R2qˆ
−2 −R3qˆ−1
}
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which delivers the following general form
U(qˆ)Υl (qˆ) +
∂Υl (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= W (qˆ) (D.3)
With U(qˆ) = R1 = Ψg , and W (qˆ) =
{
R2qˆ
−2 −R3qˆ−1
}
= Π
g
qˆ−2 − ( w˜sφ−ωl
g
)qˆ−1
This differential equation (D.3) has as integrating factor e
∫
U∂qˆ The general so-
lution is then in the form
Υl (qˆ) = e
− ∫ R1qˆ−1∂qˆ[K +
∫
(R2qˆ
−2 −R3qˆ−1)e
∫
R1qˆ−1∂qˆ]
= e−R1 ln qˆ[K +
∫
(R2qˆ
−2 −R3qˆ−1)eR1 ln qˆ∂qˆ]
= qˆ−R1 [K +
∫
(R2qˆ
−2+R1 −R3qˆR1−1)∂qˆ]
= qˆ−R1 [K +
1
R1 + − 1R2qˆ
R1+−1 −R3 1
R1
qˆR1 ]
= Kqˆ−R1 +
R2
R1 + − 1 qˆ
−1 − R3
R1
Determination of the constant term K.
When qˆ reaches qˆl,min, Υl (qˆl,min) = 0
Υl (qˆl,min) = 0
⇒ Kqˆ−R1l,min +
R2
R1 + − 1 qˆ
−1
l,min −
R3
R1
= 0
K =
R3
R1
qˆR1l,min −
R2
R1 + − 1 qˆ
R1+−1
l,min
Then we have,
Υl (qˆ) = [
R3
R1
qˆR1l,min −
R2
R1 + − 1 qˆ
R1+−1
l,min ]qˆ
−R1 +
R2
R1 + − 1 qˆ
−1 − R3
R1
= [(
w˜sφ− Ωl
g
)
g
Ψ
qˆ
Ψ
g
l,min −
Π
g
Ψ
g
+ − 1 qˆ
Ψ
g
+−1
l,min ]qˆ
−Ψ
g +
Π
g
Ψ
g
+ − 1 qˆ
−1 − (
w˜sφ−Ωl
g
)
Ψ
g
= [−(Ω
l − w˜sφ
Ψ
)qˆ
Ψ
g
l,min −
Π
Ψ + g(− 1) qˆ
Ψ
g
+−1
l,min ]
1
qˆ
Ψ
g
+
Π
Ψ + g(− 1) qˆ
−1 + (
Ωl − w˜sφ
Ψ
)
= (
Ωl − w˜sφ
Ψ
)[1− ( qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ
g ]− Π
Ψ + g(− 1) qˆ
Ψ
g
+−1
l,min
1
qˆ
Ψ
g
+
Π
Ψ + g(− 1) qˆ
−1
= (
Ωl − w˜sφ
Ψ
)[1− ( qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ
g ] +
Π
Ψ + g(− 1) qˆ
−1[1− ( qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ
g
+−1]
Defining
Fl(x) = [1− ( qˆl,min
qˆ
)x]
Appendix D. Proof of the Proposition 1: The franchise value of low-type 43
we then have
Υl (qˆ) = (
Ωl − w˜sφ
Ψ
)Fl(
Ψ
g
) +
Π
Ψ + g(− 1) qˆ
−1Fl(
Ψ
g
+ − 1) (D.4)
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Appendix E
Proof of proposition 1: Franchise
Value for a high-type
The franchise value for a high-type is given by the following differential equation:
(r + τ + ϕ) Υh (qˆ)− ∂Υ
h (qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
=
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ Ωh+ (E.1)
ν[Iqˆ>qˆl,min .υ
l (qˆ)− υh (qˆ)]}if qˆ > qˆh,min (E.2)
Υh (qˆ) = 0,Otherwise (E.3)
Given that the high-type can transition to a low-type as long as qˆ > qˆl,min since
qˆl,min > qˆh,min, we can have 2 cases from (E.1)
first: qˆl,min ≥ qˆ ≥ qˆh,min Since for qˆ < qˆl,min ,Υl (qˆ) = 0 we have the following
equation:
(Ψ + ν)Υh (qˆ)− ∂Υ
h (qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
=
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ Ωh}
Second:qˆ ≥ qˆl,min then we have the following equation
(r + τ + ϕ) Υh (qˆ)− ∂Υ
h (qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
=
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ Ωh + ν[Υl (qˆ)−Υh (qˆ)]}
(E.4)
⇒ (Ψ + ν)Υh (qˆ)− ∂Υ
h (qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
=
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ Ωh + νΥl (qˆ)}
1- Let start with the first case: qˆl,min ≥ qˆ ≥ qˆh,min
(Ψ + ν)Υh (qˆ)− ∂Υ
h (qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
=
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ Ωh}
⇒ (Ψ + ν)Υh (qˆ)− ∂Υ
h (qˆ)
(
− gqˆ) = {Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ Ωh}
⇒ (Ψ + ν
g
)qˆ−1Υh (qˆ) +
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= (
Π
g
)qˆ−2 + (
Ωh − w˜sφ
g
)qˆ−1
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Which leads to the following
K1qˆ
−1Υh (qˆ) +
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= K2qˆ
−2 +K3qˆ−1
And the first order differential equation of the following general form
U(qˆ)Υh (qˆ) +
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= W (qˆ) (E.5)
the general solution to (E.5) is
Υh (qˆ) = e
− ∫ U(qˆ)∂qˆ[D +
∫
W (qˆ)e
∫
U(qˆ)∂qˆ]
= e−
∫
K1qˆ−1∂qˆ[D +
∫
(K2qˆ
−2 +K3qˆ−1)e
∫
K1qˆ−1∂qˆ∂qˆ]
= e−K1 ln qˆ[D +
∫
(K2qˆ
−2 +K3qˆ−1)eK1 ln qˆ∂qˆ]
= qˆ−K1 [D +
∫
(K2qˆ
−2+K1 +K3qˆ−1+K1)∂qˆ]
= qˆ−K1(D +
K2qˆ
−1+K1
− 1 +K1 +
K3qˆ
K1
K1
)
Υh (qˆ) = qˆ
−K1(D +
K2qˆ
−1+K1
− 1 +K1 +
K3qˆ
K1
K1
) (E.6)
For qˆ = qˆh,min ,Υh (qˆ) = 0 then, we have
qˆ−K1h,min(D +
K2qˆ
−1+K1
h,min
− 1 +K1 +
K3qˆ
K1
h,min
K1
) = 0
⇒ D = −(K2qˆ
−1+K1
h,min
− 1 +K1 +
K3qˆ
K1
h,min
K1
)
Replacing the constant D by this value into (E.6), we obtain
Υh (qˆ) = qˆ
−K1(
K2qˆ
−1+K1
− 1 +K1 +
K3qˆ
K1
K1
− K2qˆ
−1+K1
h,min
− 1 +K1 −
K3qˆ
K1
h,min
K1
)
= qˆ−
Ψ+ν
g [
Πqˆ
Ψ+ν
g
+−1
Ψ + ν + g(− 1)+(
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)qˆ−
Ψ+ν
g − Πqˆ
Ψ+ν
g
+−1
h,min
Ψ + ν + g(− 1)−(
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)qˆ
−Ψ+ν
g
h,min ]
=
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + ν + g(− 1)−
Π
Ψ + ν + g(− 1)
qˆ
Ψ+ν+g(−1)
g
h,min
qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
+(
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)− qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
h,min
qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
(
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)
=
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + ν + g(− 1)[1− (
qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+g(−1)
g ] + (
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)[1− ( qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g ]
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Then, for qˆ ∈ [qˆh,min, qˆl,min] we have
Υh (qˆ) =
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + ν + g(− 1)Fl(
Ψ + ν + g(− 1)
g
) + (
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)Fl(
Ψ + ν
g
) (E.7)
2- Let turn back now to the second case:qˆ ≥ qˆl,min
Then we have the following equation
(Ψ + ν)Υh (qˆ)− ∂Υ
h (qˆ)
∂qˆ
∂qˆ
∂wu
∂wu
∂t
=
{
Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ Ωh + νΥl (qˆ)}
(Ψ + ν)Υh (qˆ)− (−gqˆ)∂Υ
h (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= Πqˆ−1 − w˜sφ+ Ωh + νΥl (qˆ)
(Ψ + ν)
g
qˆ−1Υh (qˆ) +
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
=
Πqˆ−2
g
− (w˜
sφ− Ωh)
g
qˆ−1 +
νΥl (qˆ) qˆ−1
g
(E.8)
From (D.4), we know that
Υl (qˆ) = (
Ωl − w˜sφ
Ψ
)[1− ( qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ
g ] +
Π
Ψ + g(− 1) qˆ
−1[1− ( qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ
g
+−1]
= (
Ωl − w˜sφ
Ψ
) + [(
w˜sφ− Ωl
Ψ
)qˆ
Ψ
g
l,min −
Π
Ψ + g(− 1) qˆ
Ψ+g(−1)
g
l,min ]qˆ
−Ψ
g +
Π
Ψ + g(− 1) qˆ
−1
= R4 +R5qˆ
−Ψ
g +R6qˆ
−1 (E.9)
Inserting (E.9) into (E.8), we obtain
(Ψ + ν)
g
qˆ−1Υh (qˆ) +
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
=
Πqˆ−2
g
− (w˜
sφ− Ωh)
g
qˆ−1 + [
νR4
g
+
νR5
g
qˆ−
Ψ
g +
νR6
g
qˆ−1]qˆ−1
(Ψ + ν)
g
qˆ−1Υh (qˆ) +
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= (
Π + νR6
g
)qˆ−2 + (
Ω− w˜sφ+ νR4
g
)qˆ−1 +
νR5
g
qˆ−
Ψ+g
g
(E.10)
(E.10) is equivalent to
C1qˆ
−1Υh (qˆ) +
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= C2qˆ
−2 + C3qˆ−1 + C4qˆ
−Ψ+g
g (E.11)
which may be written under the above general form
U(qˆ)Υh (qˆ) +
∂Υh (qˆ)
∂qˆ
= W (qˆ)
The general solution to this first order differential equation is
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Υh (qˆ) = qˆ
−C1 [D +
∫
(C2qˆ
−2 + C3qˆ−1 + C4qˆ
−Ψ+g
g )qˆC1∂qˆ]
= qˆ−C1 [D +
C2qˆ
C1+−1
C1 + − 1 +
C3qˆ
C1
C1
+
C4qˆ
C1−Ψg
C1 − Ψg
] (E.12)
We know that at qˆl,min, (E.12) equals (E.7). This relationship helps us to deter-
mine the constant term D. We have
Replacing C1, C2, C3 and C4 by their corresponding value in (E.12) and con-
sidering it at qˆl,min, we obtain
Υh (qˆl,min) = qˆ
−Ψ+ν
g
l,min [D+ (
w˜s − Ωl
Ψ
)qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
l,min +
Ψ(Ωh − w˜sφ) + ν(Ωl − w˜s)
Ψ(Ψ + ν)
qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
l,min] (E.13)
(E.7) at qˆl,min is equivalent to:
Υh (qˆl,min) =
Πqˆ−1l,min
Ψ + ν + g(− 1)[1− (
qˆh,min
qˆl,min
)
Ψ+ν+g(−1)
g ] + (
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)[1− ( qˆh,min
qˆl,min
)
Ψ+ν
g ]
(E.14)
At qˆl,min, (E.13) equals (E.14) implies
Dqˆ
−Ψ+ν
g
l,min + (
w˜s − Ωl
Ψ
)
+
Ψ(Ωh − w˜sφ) + ν(Ωl − w˜s)
Ψ(Ψ + ν)
=
Πqˆ−1l,min
Ψ + ν + g(− 1)[1− (
qˆh,min
qˆl,min
)
Ψ+ν+g(−1)
g ]
+ (
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)[1− ( qˆh,min
qˆl,min
)
Ψ+ν
g ]
We can then pin down the constant D from the above equation
D =
Πqˆ
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
l,min
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g −
Πqˆ
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
h,min
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g + (
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
l,min− (
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
h,min
− (Ω
h − w˜sφ
Ψ
)qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
l,min −
Ψ(Ωh − w˜sφ) + ν(Ωl − w˜s)
Ψ(Ψ + ν)
qˆ
Ψ+ν
g
l,min
qˆ−
Ψ+ν
g D =
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g (
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g − Πqˆ
−1)
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g (
qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
+ (
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)(
ˆql,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g − (Ω
h − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)(
ˆqh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g
− (Ω
h − w˜sφ
Ψ
)(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g − [Ψ(Ω
h − w˜sφ) + ν(Ωl − w˜s)
Ψ(Ψ + ν)
](
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g
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qˆ−
Ψ+ν
g D =
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [1−(
qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]− Πqˆ
−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [1−(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]
+ (
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)(
ˆql,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g − (Ω
h − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)(
ˆqh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g − (Ω
h − w˜sφ
Ψ
)(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g
− [Ψ(Ω
h − w˜sφ) + ν(Ωl − w˜s)
Ψ(Ψ + ν)
](
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g
qˆ−
Ψ+ν
g D =
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [1−(
qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]− Πqˆ
−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [1−(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]
+ (
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g − (Ω
h − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
)(
qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g − (Ω
h − w˜sφ
Ψ
)(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g
+ (
Ωl − Ωh
Ψ + ν
)− (w˜
sφ− Ωh
Ψ + ν
) + (
w˜sφ− Ωl
Ψ + ν
)− (w˜
sφ− Ωl
Ψ
)(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g −
(
Ψ(Ωh − w˜sφ)
Ψ(Ψ + ν)
)(
ˆql,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g + (
ν(w˜sφ− Ωl)
Ψ(Ψ + ν)
)(
ˆql,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν
g
qˆ−
Ψ+ν
g D =
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [1−(
qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]− Πqˆ
−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [1−(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]
+(
w˜sφ− Ωl
Ψ + ν
)[1−( qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]−(w˜
sφ− Ωh
Ψ + ν
)[1−( qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]+(
Ωl − Ωh
Ψ + ν
)
Now, we can replace qˆ−
Ψ+ν
g D by its expression into (E.12)
Υh (qˆ) = qˆ
−C1 [D +
C2qˆ
C1+−1
C1 + − 1 +
C3qˆ
C1
C1
+
C4qˆ
C1−Ψg
C1 − Ψg
]
= qˆ−C1D +
C2qˆ
−1
C1 + − 1 +
C3
C1
+
C4qˆ
−Ψ
g
C1 − Ψg
=
Π
g
(Ψ+ν+(−1)g
Ψ+(−1)g )
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
qˆ−1 +
Ψ(Ωh − w˜sφ) + ν(Ωl − w˜sφ)
Ψg
g
Ψ + ν
+ [(
w˜sφ− Ωl
Ψ
)qˆ
Ψ
g
l,min −
Πqˆ
Ψ+(−1)g
g
l,min
Ψ + (− 1)g ]qˆ
Ψ
g
l,min + qˆ
−C1D
Which leads to
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Υh (qˆ) =
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + (− 1)g [1− (
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+(−1)g
g ] + (
w˜sφ− Ωl
Ψ
)(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ
g
+
Ψ(Ωh − w˜sφ) + ν(Ωl − w˜sφ)
Ψ(Ψ + ν)
+ qˆ−C1D
Υh (qˆ) =
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + (− 1)g [1− (
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+(−1)g
g ] + (
w˜sφ− Ωl
Ψ
)(
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ
g
+
Ψ(Ωh − w˜sφ) + ν(Ωl − w˜sφ)
Ψ(Ψ + ν)
+
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [1− (
qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]− Πqˆ
−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1)g [1− (
qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]
+(
w˜sφ− Ωl
Ψ + ν
)[1−( qˆl,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]−(w˜
sφ− Ωh
Ψ + ν
)[1−( qˆh,min
qˆ
)
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g ]+(
Ωl − Ωh
Ψ + ν
)
And we then have
Υh (qˆ) =
{
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1) gFh
(
Ψ + ν + (− 1) g
g
)
+
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
F h
(
Ψ + ν
g
)
+
Πqˆ−1
Ψ + (− 1) gFl
(
Ψ + (− 1) g
g
)
+
Ωl − w˜sφ
Ψ
F l
(
Ψ
g
)
− Πqˆ
−1
Ψ + ν + (− 1) gFl
(
Ψ + ν + (− 1) g
g
)
+
Ωh − w˜sφ
Ψ + ν
Fl
(
Ψ + ν
g
)}
, for qˆ ≥ qˆl,min
and the final expression given for the franchise value of owning a high-type
product line:
Υh (qˆ) =

= Πqˆ
−1
Ψ+ν+(−1)gFh
(
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
)
− w˜sφ−Ωh
Ψ+ν
Fh
(
Ψ+ν
g
)
for qˆ ∈ [qˆh,min, qˆl,min]
=
{
Πqˆ−1
Ψ+ν+(−1)gFh
(
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
)
+ Ω
h−w˜sφ
Ψ+ν
F h
(
Ψ+ν
g
)
+ Πqˆ
−1
Ψ+(−1)gFl
(
Ψ+(−1)g
g
)
+ Ω
l−w˜sφ
Ψ
F l
(
Ψ
g
)
− Πqˆ−1
Ψ+ν+(−1)gFl
(
Ψ+ν+(−1)g
g
)
+ Ω
h−w˜sφ
Ψ+ν
Fl
(
Ψ+ν
g
)}
for qˆ ≥ qˆl,min
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Proof of Lemma 3: Stationary
Equilibrium productivity
Distribution
1- Let consider the product lines controlled by high-type firms.
In the stationary equilibrium,inflows and the outflows into different parts of the
distribution are equal. That is, with Fh(qˆ) as the stationary equilibrium produc-
tivity distributions of product lines controlled by high-type, and considering a
time interval ∆t, ΦhFh(qˆ, t) = ΦhFh(qˆ, t+ ∆t)
ΦhFh(qˆ) =

= Φ(1− (τ + ν + ρ)∆t)[Fh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))− Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))]
+(Φxh + αXentry)∆t[ΦhFh(qˆ
(1+g∆t)
1+λ
) + ΦlFl(qˆ
(1+g∆t)
1+λ
)
+ΦnpF (qˆ)]for qˆ > qˆh,min(1 + λ)
= Φ(1− (τ + ν + ρ)∆t)[Fh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))
−Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))]for qˆh,min(1 + g∆t) < qˆ ≤ qˆh,min(1 + λ)
A- Let consider the first option, that is when qˆ > qˆh,min(1 + λ)
ΦhFh(qˆ)−ΦhFh(qˆ(1+g∆t)) = Φ(1−(τ+ν+ρ)∆t)[Fh(qˆ(1+g∆t))−Fh(qˆh,min(1+g∆t))]
+ (Φxh + αXentry)∆t[ΦhFh(qˆ
(1 + g∆t)
1 + λ
) + ΦlFl(qˆ
(1 + g∆t)
1 + λ
)
+ ΦnpF (qˆ)]− ΦhFh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))
It follows that
ΦhFh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))− ΦhFh(qˆ) = ΦhFh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))− ΦhFh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))
+ Φh(τ + ν + ρ)∆t)Fh(qˆ(1 + g∆t)) + Φ
h(1− (τ + ν + ρ)∆t))Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))
− (Φxh + αXentry)∆t[ΦhFh(qˆ (1 + g∆t)
1 + λ
) + ΦlFl(qˆ
(1 + g∆t)
1 + λ
)
+ ΦnpF (qˆ)]
Then
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Φh[Fh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))− Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))]
∆t
= Φh(τ+ν+ρ))Fh(qˆ(1+g∆t))
− Φh(τ + ν + ρ))Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))
− (Φxh + αXentry)∆t[ΦhFh(qˆ (1 + g∆t)
1 + λ
) + ΦlFl(qˆ
(1 + g∆t)
1 + λ
) + ΦnpF (qˆ)]
[Fh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))− Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))]
∆t
= (τ + ν + ρ))[Fh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))
− Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))]
− (Φx
h + αXentry)
Φh
[ΦhFh(qˆ
(1 + g∆t)
1 + λ
) + ΦlFl(qˆ
(1 + g∆t)
1 + λ
) + ΦnpF (qˆ)] (F.1)
Let consider the LHS of (F.1) and we have
lim
∆t→0
[Fh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))− Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))]
∆t
=
∂Fh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))
∂∆t
− ∂Fh(qˆ)
∂∆t
−∂Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))
∂∆t
= gqˆfh(qˆ)− 0− gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)
= gqˆfh(qˆ)− gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)
For the RHS of (F.1), we have:
lim
∆t→0
(RHS) = (τ + ν + ρ))[Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min)]
− (Φx
h + αXentry)
Φh
[ΦhFh(
qˆ
1 + λ
) + ΦlFl(
qˆ
1 + λ
) + ΦnpF (qˆ)]
we then have the following equation for qˆ > qˆh,min(1 + λ)
gqˆfh(qˆ)− gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min) = (τ + ν + ρ))[Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min)]
− (Φx
h + αXentry)
Φh
[ΦhFh(
qˆ
1 + λ
) + ΦlFl(
qˆ
1 + λ
) + ΦnpF (qˆ)]
B- Let consider the second option, that is qˆh,min(1 + λ) < qˆ ≤ qˆh,min(1 + g∆t)
ΦhFh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))− ΦhFh(qˆ)
∆t
= Φh(τ + ν + ρ)[Fh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))
− Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))] + Φ
hFh(qˆh,min)
∆t
∆t
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lim
∆t→0
ΦhFh(qˆ(1 + g∆t))− ΦhFh(qˆ)− ΦhFh(qˆh,min)
∆t
= lim
∆t→0
(Φh(τ+ν+ρ)[Fh(qˆ(1+g∆t))
− Fh(qˆh,min(1 + g∆t))])
which leads to
gqˆfh(qˆ)− gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min) = (τ + ν + ρ)[Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min)]
for qˆh,min(1 + λ) < qˆ ≤ qˆh,min(1 + g∆t)
To sump up, we then have the following equations that are satisfied by the
stationary equilibrium productivity distributions of active product lines of high-
type.
gqˆfh(qˆ) =

= gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min) + (τ + ν + ρ))[Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min)]
− (Φxh+αXentry)
Φh
[ΦhFh(
qˆ
1+λ
) + ΦlFl(
qˆ
1+λ
) + ΦnpF (qˆ)]
for qˆ > qˆh,min(1 + λ)
= gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min) + (τ + ν + ρ)[Fh(qˆ)− Fh(qˆh,min)]
for qˆh,min(1 + λ) < qˆ ≤ qˆh,min(1 + g∆t)
2- For the low-type, similar steps are followed and lead to the equations at
3.23
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Appendix G
Aggregate output growth rate
We know from (3.5) that the economy‘s productivity index is given by
Q =
(∫
Nt
q−1j dj
) 1
−1
with Nt = N ht +N lt
Let us define
Q˜t ≡ Q−1
Then we have
Q˜t =
(∫
Nt
q−1j dj
) 1
−1 (−1)
=
∫
Nt
q−1j dj
=
∫
Nht
q−1j dj +
∫
N lt
q−1j dj
If we consider a short time ∆t, the productivity index of product lines owned by
high-type firms will become Q˜ht+∆t which is given by:
Q˜ht+∆t =
∫
Nht
{
(xh + αXentry)∆t[(1 + λ)qjt]
−1
+ (1− τ∆t− ν∆t− ρ∆t)[1− Fh((1 + g∆t)qˆh,min)]q−1jt
}
dj
+
∫
N lt
(xh + αXentry)∆t[(1 + λ)qjt]
−1dj
+
∫
Nnpt
(xh + αXentry + %Φh)∆tEq−1t+∆tdj (G.1)
Intuitive explanation of the RHS of (G.1)
First line: For the short time period ∆t, high-type incumbents and high-type
entrants can improve upon existing product lines owned yet by high-type in-
cumbents, this at the total rate (xh + αXentry) and the productivity goes from
qjt → ∆t(1 + λ)qjt
Second line: For the short time period ∆t, product lines own by high-type will
undergo an overall destructive shock of total rate (τ − ν − ρ)∆t. This line gives
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the productivity of high-type incumbent product lines that would have survived
the global shock at the end of the length of time ∆t. The relative productivity of
such product line qˆ is qˆ ≥ (1 + g∆)qˆh,min and
Pr[qˆ > (1 + g∆)qˆh,min] = 1− Fh((1 + g∆t)qˆh,min)
The third line: For the short time period ∆t, this gives the high-type produc-
tivity increase due to high-type entrant and high-type incumbent improvements
upon product lines yet owned by low-type incumbents.
The fourth line:high-type incumbent and high-type entrant improvements upon
inactive product lines and also a non-R&D related positive productive shock in
high-type firms on inactive product lines.
The growth rate of productivity of product lines own by high-type firms gh is
given by
gh =
∂Q˜ht
∂t
Q˜ht
=
lim∆t→0
Q˜ht+∆t−Q˜ht
Q˜ht ∆t
Q˜ht
= lim
∆t→0
Q˜ht+∆t − Q˜ht
Q˜ht ∆t
Then we have
Q˜ht+∆t − Q˜ht =
∫
Nht
(xh + αXentry)∆t[(1 + λ)]−1q−1jt dj
+
∫
Nht
[1− Fh((1 + g∆t)qˆh,min)]q−1jt dj
+
∫
Nht
∆t(τ + ν + φ)Fh((1 + g∆t)qˆh,min)q
−1
jt dj
−
∫
Nht
(τ + ν + φ)∆tq−1jt dj +
∫
N lt
(xh + αXentry)∆t[(1 + λ)]−1q−1jt dj
+
∫
Nnpt
(xh + αXentry + %Φh)∆tEq−1t+∆tdj − Q˜ht
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which leads to
Q˜ht+∆t − Q˜ht = (xh + αXentry)∆t[(1 + λ)]−1Q˜ht + Q˜ht
− Fh((1 + g∆t)qˆh,min)[1−∆t(τ + ν + φ)]Q˜ht −∆t(τ + ν + φ)Q˜ht
+ (xh + αXentry)Q˜lt∆t[(1 + λ)]
−1
+ (xh + αXentry − %Φh)∆tΦnpEq−1t+∆t − Q˜ht
Then we can have
Q˜ht+∆t − Q˜ht
Q˜ht ∆t
= (xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)]−1
− Fh((1 + g∆t)qˆh,min)[1−∆t(τ + ν + φ)]
∆t
− (τ + ν + φ)
+ (xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)]−1
Q˜lt
Q˜ht
+ (xh + αXentry − %Φh)Φ
np
Eq−1t+∆t
Q˜ht
lim
∆t→0
Q˜ht+∆t − Q˜ht
Q˜ht ∆t
= (xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)]−1
− lim
∆t→0
Fh((1 + g∆t)qˆh,min)[1−∆t(τ + ν + φ)]
∆t
− (τ + ν + φ) + (xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)]−1 Q˜
l
t
Q˜ht
+ (xh + αXentry − %Φh)Φ
np
Eq−1t+
Q˜ht
lim
∆t→0
Q˜ht+∆t − Q˜ht
Q˜ht ∆t
= (xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)]−1
− gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)− (τ + ν + φ)
+ (xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)]−1
Q˜lt
Q˜ht
+ (xh + αXentry − %Φh)Φ
np
Eq−1t
Q˜ht
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Then,we have
gh =
{
(xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)−1(1 +
Q˜lt
Q˜ht
) +
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜ht
]
− (τ + ν + φ) + %ΦnpΦ
np
Eq−1t
Q˜ht
− gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)
}
(G.2)
For product lines owned by low-type firms, we proceed via similar steps and
we obtain
gl =
{
(xh + (1− α)Xentry)[(1 + λ)−1(1 + Q˜
h
t
Q˜lt
) +
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜lt
]
− (τ + φ) + ν[1− Fl(qˆl,min)]Q˜
h
t
Q˜lt
+ %Φl
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜lt
− gqˆl,minfh(qˆl,min)
}
(G.3)
In the stationary equilibrium, the ration Q˜
h
t
Q˜lt
remains constant, which means
that Q˜l and Q˜h grow at the same rate. In other words, at the stationary equilib-
rium, gl = gh
At the same time, we know that
Q˜t = Q
−1
t
⇒ Qt = Q˜
1
−1
t
For g less than 10 percent, we have
g = lnQt+1 − lnQt
= ln Q˜
1
−1
t+1 − ln Q˜
1
−1
t
=
1
− 1(ln Q˜t+1 − ln Q˜t)
=
gh
− 1 =
gl
− 1
Using the productivity index of product lines owned by high-type firms, the
growth rate of the economy is then given by:
g =
gh
− 1 =
(xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)−1(1 + Q˜
l
t
Q˜ht
) +
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜ht
]
− 1
+
%Φnp
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜ht
− (τ + ν + φ)− gqˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)
− 1
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⇒ g(1 + qˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)
− 1 ) =
(xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)−1(1 + Q˜
l
t
Q˜ht
) +
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜ht
]
− 1
+
%Φnp
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜ht
− (τ + ν + φ)
− 1
then,
g =
(xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)−1(1 + Q˜
l
t
Q˜ht
) +
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜ht
] + %Φh
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜ht
− (τ + ν + φ)
(− 1) + qˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)
Defining Γ = Q˜
h
t
Q˜lt
and κk =
ΦnpEq−1t
Q˜kt
we finally have
g =
(xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)−1(1 + 1
Γ
) + κh] + %Φ
hκh − (τ + ν + φ)
(− 1) + qˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)
In such a way that Γ is solution to the equation gl = gh, that is
(xh + αXentry)[(1 + λ)−1(1 +
1
Γ
) + κh] + %κ
h[Φh − ΦlΓ] = ν[1 + [1− Fh(qˆl,min)]Γ]
+ (xl + αXentry)[(1 + λ)−1(1 +
1
Γ
) + κl]
+ g[qˆh,minfh(qˆh,min)− qˆh,minfl(qˆl,min)]
58
Bibliography
Acemoglu, D. and D. Cao (2015). “Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents”. In:
Journal of Economic Theory 157.157, pp. 255–294.
Acemoglu, D. et al. (2013). “Innovation, Reallocation and Growth”. In: CEP Dis-
cussion Paper 1216.12, pp. 1–50.
Aghion, P. and J. Jaravel (2015). “Knowledge Spillovers, Innovation and Growth”.
In: The Economic Journal 125, pp. 533–573.
Aghion, P. and G. Saint-Paul (1998). “Uncovering some causal relationships be-
tween productivity growth and structure of economic fluctuations: A tentative
survey”. In: Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations 12.2, pp. 279–
303.
Akcigit, U. and W. Kerr (2015). “Growth through heteregenous innovations”. In:
pp. 1–55.
Bosch, F., H. Volberda, and M. Boer (1996). “Coevolution of firm absorptive ca-
pacity and knowledge environment: Organizational forms and combinative
capabilities”. In: Organization Science 10.5, pp. 551–568.
Caballero, R. and M. Hammour (1991). “The cleansing effect of recessions”. In:
NBER Working Paper Series 3922, pp. 1–31.
Caballero, R. J. and A. B. Jaffe (1993). “How High Is the Giant‘s Shoulders: an
Empirical Assessment of Knowledge Spillovers and Creative Destruction in
a Model of Economic Growth”. In: ed. by O. Blanchad and S. Fischer. NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 1993. Vol. 8. 12. MIT Press.
Cin, B. C., Y. J. Kim, and N. S. Vonortas (2013). “The impact of government R&D
subsidies on firm performance: Evidence from Korean SMEs”. In: Asian Re-
search Symposium 1.1, pp. 1–25.
Clausen, T. H. (2009). “Do Subsidies Have Positive Impacts on R&D and Innova-
tion Activities at the Firm Level?” In: Structural Change and Economic Dynamics
20.1, pp. 239–254.
Cohen, W. and S. Klepper (1996). “A reprise of size and R&D”. In: The Economic
Journal 106.437, pp. 925–951.
Cohen, W. and D. Levinthal (1990a). “Fortune favors the prepared firm”. In: Man-
agement Science 40.2, pp. 227–251.
Cohen, W. M. and D. A. Levinthal (1989). “Innovation and learning:the two faces
of R&D”. In: The Economic Journal 99.3, pp. 546–573.
— (1990b). “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innova-
tion”. In: Administrative Science Quaterly 35.1, pp. 128–152.
Davidson, C. and P. Sergerstrom (1998). “R&D Susidies and Economic Growth”.
In: The RAND Journal of Economics 30.3, pp. 548–577.
Einiö, Elias (2014). “R&D subsidies and companies performance: Evidence from
Geographic Variation in Government Funding Based on the ERDF Population-
density Rule”. In: The Review of Economics and Statistics 96.4, pp. 710–729.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 59
Ewijk, C. Van (1997). “Entry, Exit, Growth and Innovation Over the Product Life
Cycle”. In: Oxford Economics Papers 49.1, pp. 167–187.
Foster, L., J. Haltiwanger, and S. Syverson (2008). “Reallocation, Firm Turnover,
and Efficiency: Selection on Productivity or Profitability”. In: American Eco-
nomic Review 98.1, pp. 394–425.
Foster, L., J. Waltiwanger, and C. Krizan (2001). “Aggregate productivity growth.Lessons
from microeconomic evidence”. In: ed. by C. Hulten, E. Dean, and M. Harper.
New development in productivity analysis. Vol. 1. 1. University of Chicago
Press.
— (2006). “Market selection, reallocation and restructuring in the US retail trade
sector in the 1990s”. In: Review of Economics and Statistics 88.4, pp. 748–758.
GarciaMarcia, D., C. Hsieh, and P. J. Klenow (2015). “How destructive is innova-
tion?” In: Stanford Working Paper Series 1.1, pp. 1–36.
Gorg, H. and E. Strobl (2007). “The Effects of R&D Subsidies on Private R&D”. In:
Economica 74.1, pp. 215–234.
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991). “Knowledge Spillovers, Innovation and
Growth”. In: The Review of Economic Studies 58.1, pp. 43–61.
Hall, B. H. and J. Van Reenen (1999). “How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D?
a review of the evidence”. In: NBER Working Paper 7098.1, pp. 1–54.
Hurry, D., A. Miller, and E. Bowman (1992). “Calls on high technology: Japeneese
exploration of venture capital in United States”. In: Review of Economics and
Statistics 13.2, pp. 85–101.
Jovanovic, B. (1982). “Selection and the evolution of industry”. In: Econometrica
50.3, pp. 649–670.
Kim, D. J. and B. Kogut (1996). “Technological platforms and diversification”. In:
Organization Science 7.1, pp. 283–303.
Klepper, S. (1996). “Entry, Exit, Growth and Innovation Over the Product Life
Cycle”. In: American Economic Review 86.3, pp. 562–583.
Klepper, T., J. Moen, and Z. Griliches (2000). “Do Subsidies to Commercial R&D
Reduce Market Failure? Microeconometric Evaluation Studies”. In: Research
Policy 29.1, pp. 471–495.
Klette, T. J. and S. Kortum (2004). “Innovating Firms and Aggregate Innovation”.
In: Journal of Political Economy 112.5, pp. 986–1018.
Lach, Saul (2000). “Do R&D subsidies stimulate or displace private R&D? Evi-
dence from Israel”. In: NBER Working Paper 7943.1, pp. 1–39.
Lin, S. (2015). “Are Ivory Towers Really Ivory: Knowledge Spillovers and Firm
Innovation”. In: Journal of Economics and Business 80.12, pp. 21–36.
Manfield, E. (1986). “The R&D Tax Credit and Other Technology Policy Issues”.
In: American Economic Review 76.2, pp. 190–194.
Nieto, M. and D. Quevedo (2005). “Absorptive Capacity, Technological Oppor-
tunity, Knowledge Spillovers and Innovative Effort”. In: Technovation 25.1,
pp. 1141–1157.
Nocke, V. (2003). “A gap for me: Entrepreneurs and entry”. In: PIER Working Paper
03019, pp. 1–29.
Segerstrom, P. S. (2000). “The longrun growth effects of R&D subsidies”. In: Jour-
nal of Economic Growth 5.1, pp. 277–305.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 60
Stiglitz, J. E. (1993). “Endogenous growth and cycles”. In: NBER Working Paper
Series 4286, pp. 1–57.
